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Notes from a Climate Change Pressure-Cooker:
Sub-Federal Attempts at Transformation Meet
National Resistance in the USA
CINNAMON CARLARNE

Global climate change poses one of the most pressing environmental,
economic, and socialproblems of the 21st Century. The United States of
America bears a disproportionate burden for contributing to global
climate change and has the capacity-ifnot the will-to be a world leader
in combating climate change. Local, state and civil society efforts to
transform climate change policy-making in America, however, have met
with persistent resistance at the federal level, spurring a new era in
American environmental policy. While the federal government was once
the leader in environmental policy-making, it is now-at times-the
laggard. Meanwhile, sub-federal actorsfind increasinglyinspiredways to
pushfor more progressiveclimate change policies. Much has been written
about sub-federal efforts to adopt climate change policies, but this is just
the tip of the iceberg. From adopting localpolicies, to employing common
law and tort-basedlitigation, to using existingfederal environmentallaws,
to invoking the jurisdiction of internationalinstitutions, civil society is
utilizing every possible mechanism to overcome stagnation and resistance
at the nationallevel andthereby drive a progressive climate change policy
agendafrom the bottom up. This Article examines new and creative uses
of local, nationaland internationallaw to overcome federal resistanceand
to force legal transformationsin climate change policy-making in America.
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Notes from a Climate Change Pressure-Cooker:
Sub-Federal Attempts at Transformation Meet
National Resistance in the USA
CINNAMON CARLARNE*
I. INTRODUCTION

While once a fringe issue largely confined to scientific deliberation
and campaigned for by avid environmentalists, global climate change now
dominates mainstream social and political debate. From science, to
religion, to economics, to health, to development studies, to law, there is
virtually no academic or political forum that does not maintain on-going
deliberations about the causes and consequences of climate change.
Although it has long been recognized that combating climate change will
require multifaceted modifications to primary economic, social and legal
structures, it is only within the past two years that the complexity of these
changes has begun to be reflected in conventional thought and debate
worldwide. This sea change has resulted in an outpouring of academic and
popular ponderings. What is still unclear, however, is how the upswing in
attention to climate change has impacted climate change policy-making at
the local, national and international levels.
In the context of the United States of America, any in-depth analysis of
climate change policy-making reveals a complicated picture of pushes and
pulls--of stagnation and resistance to change at the top meeting innovation
and pressure for progress from below. The phenomenon of grassroots
pressure driving environmental change is not new. In the case of climate
change, however, the profile and ingenuity of these so-called "grassroots"
efforts to influence policy-making in the United States suggests a new type
of environmental problem and a new style of political change. Grassroots
efforts to force the federal government to adopt more progressive climate
change policies reveal the unheralded urgency of the issue, the diversity of
interested and potentially affected parties, and the striking alterations in the
nature of US environmental politics.
Part II of this discussion briefly reviews the international climate
change framework, with particular emphasis on the Kyoto Protocol. Part
III reviews the historical development of environmental policy in the
United States, with specific reference to the role of different levels of
* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law.
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government in environmental policy-making over time. Parts IV and V
then examine climate change policy-making in the United States. In
particular, Part IV examines state and local law and policy-making efforts
while Part V analyses how civil society is using litigation, regulation and
recourse to international law to influence climate change policy.
II. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE FRAMEWORK

The debate over global climate change now dominates national and
international political agendas. The evolution of climate change from a
peripheral topic to one of the most highly contentious themes of political
debate can be traced through the development of the international climate
change legal regime, as embodied by the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)' and the Kyoto Protocol 2 to
the UNFCCC.
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol embody international efforts to
address the causes and consequences of global climate change. The
UNFCCC promotes the goal of "stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system." 3 Together, the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol create the backbone of international
climate change politics.
The breadth and objectives of the UNFCCC and, especially, the Kyoto
Protocol, represent a new era in international environmental law-one that
reflects the dual reality that environmental change can no longer be
regarded as peripheral to social and economic well-being and that efforts to
prevent and adapt to environmental change will require concerted
international cooperation and transformations in how we think about and
interact with the natural environment. The Kyoto Protocol, more than any
existing multilateral environmental agreement, is likely to impact national
and local economies, cultural patterns, and political perspectives. 4 The
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, however, will only prove effective if
States implement effective domestic policies, especially in key nations
such as the United States.
III. CLIMATE CHANGE LAWS AND POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES

Compared to many Nation States, the United States has a relatively
1United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9 1992, S.TREATY DOC.
No. 102-38, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC].
2 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted Dec.
11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter
Kyoto Protocol].
3 UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 2.

4The Kyoto Protocol came into force in February 2005. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2.
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short legal history.
Compared with many other fields of law,
environmental law is a young legal field. For this reason, environmental
law presented the United States with the opportunity to put its mark on an
evolving field of law. And, in the nascent days of environmental law, the
United States seized the opportunity to lead and shape the discipline. More
than thirty years after the dawning of the environmental law era, however,
the United States faces a critical challenge in maintaining its status as an
innovator and trendsetter in the field of environmental law and policyglobal climate change.
A. American Federalism& EnvironmentalPolicyThe federal government has fashioned and dominated much of the
United States' environmental law and policy since the 1970s. 5 Federal
jurisdiction over environmental policy is grounded in the arguments that
federal environmental policy: (1) "is more efficient than state regulation at
achieving specific goals"; (2) is capable of regulating pollution across state
borders-relying primarily on authority under the Commerce Clause; (3)
prevents states from reducing social welfare in response to competition for
industry-i.e., prevents a "race to the bottom" in environmental standards;
(4) "more properly takes environmental interests into account than state
political processes; and (5) codifies moral rights." 6 These arguments focus
on the benefits of harmonization, uniformity and economies of scale.
For these reasons, the federal government has taken decisive control in
the context of environmental law. While it shares authority over
environmental issues with the states, since the 1970s, the federal
government has consistently dictated the parameters of the environmental
agenda. The federal government generously shares its implementation
authority with the states; but, as will be demonstrated in the context of
climate change, it shares law making and agenda setting authority much
less willingly.
B. The Environmental Decade
The 1970s heralded a decade of environmental mobilization and
environmental policymaking at the domestic and international level. In the
United States, the era was characterized by a shift in political and
legislative power from the state governments to the federal government
' Cinnamon Gilbreath, Federalism in the Context of Yucca Mountain: Nevada v. Department of
Energy, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 577, 592 (2000); Joshua D. Samoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only
from a National Perspective) For Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.

225, 227 (1997); see also Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD.L. REv. 1141, 1159-78 (1995) (describing in detail the history of
environmental federalism).
6 Gilbreath, supra note 5, at 592 (citing Samoff, supra note 5, at 230).
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and increased coordination between public, private and governmental
During this era,
institutions to address environmental problems.
environmental protection was a relatively non-partisan issue-it was
treated as commonly desirable and in the common good. Taking
advantage of the popular and political consensus, between 1970 and 1973
Congress enacted a majority of the federal environmental laws that
continue to shape environmental decision-making at the federal and state
level in the United States today.7
The environmental laws enacted during this era still form the
backbone-and much of the substance--of US environmental law and
policy. The federal environmental laws of the 1970s were groundbreaking
domestically and internationally. They set the standards for environmental
protection in the United States and provided paradigms for environmental
law-making worldwide.
As with most complex social and scientific problems, bipartisan
support for environmental issues lived a short life. By the late 1970s,
political consensus on environmental protection began to crumble, in large
part due to the looming oil crisis and the ensuing juxtaposition of
environmental and economic priorities-a prominent link in the current
federal climate change debate.
By the mid-1980s, what was left of the early environmental
momentum eroded amidst the regulatory rollbacks of the Reagan era.
Partisan politics defined environmental law during the 1980s. By the time
President Bush (I) came into office, the federal government no longer
possessed a strong political mandate to deal with issues of environmental
law.
The past decade and a half has witnessed much of the same. President
Clinton advocated a more extensive environmental agenda than his two
predecessors, but his leadership was sporadic and inconsistent at best; and
his efforts were repeatedly rejected by a Republican Congress that was
unsympathetic to progressive, federally-driven environmental laws. 9 And,
as President Clinton stepped down and President George W. Bush took
office in 2000, environmentalists prepared themselves for what they
foresaw as their greatest political challenge since the days of President
Reagan.
Throughout his presidency, Bush has attempted to "roll back"

7 E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 7401-7642 (1970).
8 See generally ROBERT F. DURANT, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY REVISITED: PUBLIC
LANDS,

THE BLM, AND THE REAGAN REVOLUTION (1992)

(describing the changes made to

environmental policy during the Reagan Administration).
9 See, e.g., Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants, Environmental Policy Under Bush II,

14

DUKE ENv. L. & POL'Y F. 363, 394 (2004) (describing the Roadless Rule that Clinton pushed through
in the last days of his Presidency).
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environmental laws, regulations and policies' ° perceived to be
economically detrimental or onerous for industry. One of Bush's most
egregious "roll backs" was his withdrawal of support for the Kyoto
Protocol." President Bush's approach to environmental policies during the
era of critical Kyoto negotiations sets the stage for the analysis of US
climate change laws and policies that follows.
C. Federal-StateRelations in U.S. EnvironmentalLaw
United States' environmental policy-making is in a new phase of
evolution; on-going changes are highlighted by trends in climate change
policy-making. Before examining these changes, it is worth briefly
reviewing the intra- and inter-state dynamics that have characterized much
of U.S. environmental policy-making to date, as the roles of the federal and
state governments are beginning to change noticeably in the context of
climate change.
As discussed, prior to the 1970s, states played a central role in defining
environmental policies within their territories; federal environmental
policies were generally limited to designating protected areas, controlling
use of federal lands, and encouraging-rather than mandating-that states
take action to address specified types of pollution and resource depletion.
In the 1970s, however, Congress began to legislate how, when, and where
states should act on the environment.' 2 The shift was sudden and enduring
and has shaped US environmental law and policy-making for over thirty
years.13
The federal government has formed the framework for environmental
law in the United States. Within that framework, states have significant
responsibility and competence to decide how to meet federal standards.
Further, by and large, states also have the right to adopt environmental
standards that are more stringent than federal standards, so long as the state
standards do not conflict with or usurp federal law. In practice, however, it
is often difficult for states to adopt environmental laws that exceed federal
standards.
State implementation of federal environmental laws has varied over
time and across environmental media. In the context of air pollution, for
example, the EPA relies on states to create and execute State
Implementation Plans (SIPs) to fully implement the Clean Air Act National
'0Id. at 364.
"Id. at 365.
12 See generallyJonathan H. Adler, When is Two a Crowd? The Impact of FederalAction on State
Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67 (2007) (discussing.the relationship between
state and federal governments in the context of environmental rulemaking in the USA).
"3See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing EnvironmentalFederalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 600-

603 (1996) (describing environmental regulation centralization in the 1970s).
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Ambient Air Quality Standards. The EPA has grappled with states both
failing to develop and implement SIPs, and with legal challenges to state
SIPs on grounds that the SIP is overly stringent.' 5 Similarly, with the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), states have challenged decisions both to
list and not to list threatened and endangered species.' 6 The relationship
between the federal government and the states in the area of environmental
governance is varied and complex, as the climate change debate reveals.
Despite tight federal control over the environmental agenda, subfederal governmental entities have often adopted state- and local-level
environmental laws that complement but tighten federal environmental
standards. As one commentator notes: "many U.S. federal environmental
laws and multilateral international environmental agreements came about
only after the underlying environmental issue was already being addressed
by a subset of lower-level jurisdictions."' 7 There are a number of
examples of the federal legislature adopting policies that are modeled on
policies at the state level, the best example being the development of the
federal social security system.' 8 In the environmental realm, the federal
legislature embraced state-based models when it enacted the Clean Air
Act, the Clean Water Act, the Surface Mining Reclamation Act, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability
20
Act,' and the Toxics Release Inventory.
Until very recently, however, state and local efforts to lead national
environmental law-making on issues that are interstate or international in
nature and efforts to concertedly-either independently or in regional
blocks-push for more progressive federal environmental law-making and
participation in international diplomacy have not been the norm.2' In the
past, the occasions where states have had the most impact on influencing
1442 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2000).

15 See generally Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975) (allowing
state's to adopt stringent SIPs with plants that are economically and technologically infeasible and
preventing EPA from questioning a state's wisdom in this regard); Ober v. EPA, 84 F.3d 304 (9th Cir.
1996) (discussing a state's compliance with the SIP requirement); Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687 (9th
Cir. 1990) (providing a history of the FIP requirement).
16E.g., Maine v. Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 262 F.3d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (denying state

challenege of listing Atlantic Salmon as endangered species under the ESA).
17Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, SubglobalRegulation of the Global Commons: The Case
ofClimate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 223 (2005).
18See Barry G. Rabe, North American Federalism and Climate Change Policy: American State
and CanadianProvincialPolicy Development, 14 WIDENER L.J. 121, 152 (2004) (stating that "[t]here
are decades of precedent for basing federal policy on previous state innovations, from Social Security
to the Toxic Release Inventory").
19See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratoriesfor Local Solutions for Global Problems: State,
Local and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate
Change, 12 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 15, 16 (2004) (listing federal legislation sparked by state laws).
20 See Rabe, supra note 18, at 152 (stating that Toxic Release Inventory stemmed from a statebased innovation).
21See McKinstry, Jr., supra note 19, at 16 (stating that despite the problem ofjurisdiction, states
and localities have started to establish their own solutions to interstate and international problems).
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environmental law have been (1) when individual states have generated
successful models for addressing an environmental problem, or (2) when
states have adopted regulatory regimes that differ from state to state, and
have thus prompted the private sector to push for a comprehensive federal
regulation to avoid being subject to multiple state regulatory regimes.
Equally, coordinated state efforts to influence the federal government to
adopt a stronger role in international environmental law-making and/or
improved federal compliance with international environmental law have
been modest. 22 Interest group politics-including both industry and
environmentalist actors-have often been more influential than state and
local politics in influencing the federal environmental agenda.23 Economic
factors 24 and interest group influence-rather than pressure from state and
local governments-has tended to drive federal efforts to engage
environmental problems at the level of international law. The same has
been true at the domestic level. State interests are expressed through
congressional representation. There is, however, a crucial difference
between state representation within the federal government and the ability
of state-level politics to influence federal decision-making. While the
former maneuvers from the inside, the latter works from the outside; in
political terms, the difference between a political insider and a political
outsider should not be underestimated.
At present, the relationship between the federal government and the
states in environmental policy-making is in a state of flux. 25 United States
and global environmental law-making is at a cross roads. Local and global
environmental problems are no longer distinct. Neither national boundaries
nor national politics can prevent the two-local and global-from meeting.
Similarly, while the Nation State continues to reign supreme, the distance
between local action and international consequences is narrowing, and
Nation State laws and policies are increasingly influenced both by subnational actors pushing for action from the inside, and international actors
pushing for action from the outside. Where these internal and external
forces converge, national governments experience unprecedented levels of
pressure. Nowhere is this better demonstrated than in the context of
22 There

are, of course, exceptions. As a rule, however, States have not consistently or effectively

shaped Federal international environmental legal negotiations.
23 See Engel & Saleska, supra note 17, at 224-28 (examining the influence of interest groups on
prompting federal environmental regulation).
24 The potential "economic harm suffered by the regulated domestic industries and the potential
for economic gain offered by internationalization," e.g., higher production costs and substitute
substances, are key drivers in choosing international policies for the US. ELIZABETH R. DESOMBRE,
DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: INDUSTRY, ENVIRONMENTALISTS,
AND U.S. POWER 9 (2000).

25 See, e.g., Ron Scherer & Alexandra Marks, New Environmental Cops: State Attorneys General,
CHRISTIAN SC1. MONITOR., July 22, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0722/p03sO1usju.html (discussing how state attorneys general are starting to take on activist roles with interstate
environmental issues).
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climate change law and policy-making in the United States.
D. United States FederalClimate Change Policy
In the United States, politicians, academics, interest groups, media and
civil society organizations have rallied around the issue of climate
change-both for and against raising its place on the political agenda. The
discussion that follows provides a brief overview of the United States'
federal climate change policy.
The tendency in analyzing U.S.a climate change policy is to say that it
is non-existent or, at least, legally irrelevant. This characterization is not
far from true; however, it is also not completely true. The U.S. federal
government has an official climate change policy. This policy, however,
lacks the form, substance and direction that one would expect from a
political, economic, and-formerly--environmental world-leader.
In
particular, the U.S. climate change policy lacks substantive legal content.
The U.S. federal government has, arguably, abdicated its role as the
national leader in many spheres of environmental law, and certainly in
climate change law and policy. As two legal commentators characterize
the trend:
Recently, the federal government's withdrawal from its role
at the forefront of environmental policy has opened up
opportunities for states to fill the vacuum. And for no issue
is the contrast between the current federal and state stance on
environmental issues more stark than on climate change.26
The federal climate change policy, as enunciated by President George
W. Bush, reflects a stark and undeniable shift away from the federal
environmental leadership that characterized much of environmental law
and policy-making in the modem era. This is true, not least of all, because
the U.S. strategy is based merely on a climate change policy, and it lacks
the laws or enforceable obligations/regulationsnecessary to substantiate it
and give it form.
In the run-up to the 2000 presidential election, then-candidate George
W. Bush ran on a campaign that included a promise to regulate CO 2.27
Upon election, however, President Bush "reversed [his] position on the
regulation of carbon dioxide as an air pollutant, 28 and shortly thereafter
issued a now infamous letter saying that he would not commit to any
protocol under the UNFCCC that would exempt developing countries from
26 Engel
27

& Saleska, supra note 17, at 216.

See DANA R. FISHER, NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME

134-35
28 (2004).
1d. at 134.
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obligatory emission reduction obligations.29
With an expressly anti-Kyoto Protocol presidential administration in
the White House and an anti-Kyoto Protocol majority in Congress, the
executive and legislative branches merged and "temporarily unified the
U.S. government's position on the issue of climate change-albeit a
position different from any other country in the world."30 From there,
however, the President stalled on the question of climate change, leaving
the United States without a formal position for almost a year.
E. PresidentBush's NationalClimate Change Strategy: An Overview
President Bush launched the U.S. Global Climate Change Initiative in
February 2002, thus bringing an end to a year of political silence on global
climate change. 3 1 The Global Climate Change Initiative-including the
Global Climate Change Policy Book as its centrepiece-articulated the
new U.S. strategy for addressing climate change.32
President Bush's climate change plan is based on reducing greenhouse
gas "intensity," which measures the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to
economic output. 33 The initiative calls for an 18 percent reduction in
greenhouse gas intensity by 2012. Nowhere does the plan commit to, or
support, absolute reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The President's
reliance on greenhouse gas intensity rather than absolute reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions purportedly allows the U.S. to "reduc[e] the
growth of GHG emissions, while sustaining the economic growth needed
to finance investment in new, clean energy technologies" in the longer
term. 3
This new climate change framework is based on President Bush's firm
belief that "economic growth and environmental protection go hand in
hand" 36 and that "economic growth is essential to fostering societal
preferences for environmental protection as well as providing the means

29 See

Letter from President George W. Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts (Mar.

13, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html ("As you
know, I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world including major
population centers such as China and India, from compliance ......
30 FISHER, supra note 27, at 135.
31Remarks Announcing the Clear Skies and Global Climate Change Initiatives in Silver Spring,
Maryland, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 232, 232-36 (Feb. 18, 2002), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002presidential-document&docid-pdfl
8fe02 txt-18.pdf [hereinafter Clear Skies and Global Climate Change Initiative].
32 Id.; see also Press Release, The White House, Global Climate Change Policy Book, (Feb.
2002), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html [hereinafter
Global Climate Change Policy Book].
" Global Climate Change Policy Book, supra note 32.
3 id.
35 id.
36 Clear Skies and Global Climate Change Initiative, supra note 31, at 236.
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for that protection. 3 7 As one commentator characterized President Bush's
climate change policy:
Bush's global climate change policy proposed to address
what many perceived as the most significant global
environmental threat with only further study and a voluntary
incentives program for industry. He invited us to assume
with him that protection would follow from affluence.3 8
As a party to the UNFCCC, U.S. climate change policy must be
analyzed against the provisions of the Convention.
Although the
Framework Convention did not establish State-specific emission reduction
obligations, it established the "aim of returning [greenhouse gas emissions]
individually or jointly to their 1990 levels., 39 The UNFCCC emission
reduction goal is written in terms of absolute emission reductions. Despite
committing to the terms of the UNFCCC and enumerating national goals in
the Global Climate Change Policy Book, "U.S. [greenhouse gas] emissions
are projected to increase by another 14% by 2012, which would mean that
the U.S. will be 28% over the target levels it agreed to meet in the

[UNFCCC].'

Despite these projections, President Bush claims victory, citing the fact
that greenhouse gas intensity is projected to decrease by 18%. 4' Using this
intensity metric is deceptive. If the United States bases its greenhouse gas
emissions on an intensity metric, so long as U.S. economic output
increases over the next decade, the intensity metric means that greenhouse
gas intensity will automatically decrease, even if the United States does
nothing to actually reduce absolute emissions.4 2
Yet still "the
administration's own figures show a projected net increase of 14% in GHG
emissions over the next decade. 43 Despite manifestly acknowledging that
the strategy does nothing to reduce absolute emissions and will not meet
the United States' obligations under the UNFCCC, the current
administration promotes the greenhouse gas intensity approach as a
"[s]erious, but [m]easured [m]itigation [r]esponse,"
and a way to avoid
' 44
"[h]arming the [e]conomy in the [s]hort [t]erm.
37 Jonathan Cannon & Jonathan Riehl, Presidential Greenspeak: How Presidents Talk About the
Environment and What It Means, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 195, 227 (2004).
38id,
39 UNFCCC, supranote 1, art. 4(2)(b).
40 Parenteau, supra note 9, at 368.
41 See Global Climate Change Policy Book, supra note 32 (calling for a reduction in greenhouse
gas intensity by eighteen percent within ten years).
42 Further, as one commentator points out: "[T]he intensity concept is a two-edged sword, since it
would require greater levels of emissions control at times of lowest economic growth, when less money
may be available for investment in technologies which might increase energy efficiency or control
emissions." McKinstry, Jr., supra note 19, at 24-25.
43Parenteau, supra note 9, at 368.
4Global Climate Change Policy Book, supra note 32.
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President Bush's National Climate Change Strategy: The Detailed
Provisions

The U.S. government has not enacted any primary climate change
legislation. Unlike the environmental era of the 1970s, when the federal
government set the tone for domestic and international responses to
fundamental
environmental
problems
by
enacting
framework
environmental legislation, the United States has failed to develop either
piecemeal or comprehensive climate change legislation.
Aside from early efforts to discourage U.S. participation in the Kyoto
Protocol, until very recently Congress remained unusually silent on the
question of climate change. Congress has, as of yet, declined to adopt any
legislation directly mandating greenhouse gas emission reductions.
Congress' inactivity mirrors the response by many federal administrative
agencies, such as the EPA, which has resisted efforts to use existing
environmental legislation to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.4 5
With the exception of congressional decisions to appropriate funding
for climate change research, technology development, and limited
renewable energy tax credits,4 the core of the U.S. federal climate change
strategy is found in the President's global climate change initiative. Until
Congress acts definitively on the question of climate change, one must
analyze the White House Global Climate Change Initiative in order to
analyze U.S. climate change policy.
G. Recent CongressionalActivity
For better or for worse, President Bush and the executive branch have
dominated the federal climate change agenda since releasing the Global
Climate Change Initiative in 2002. This imbalance of power stands to
change. During its 110th session, members of Congress have proposed
multiple climate change bills in both the House and the Senate.
The new Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) has said that she
plans to pass legislation designed to address global climate change by July
of 2007. To this end, she is co-sponsoring the Safe Climate Act bill with
Henry Waxman (D-CA).4 7
Similarly, four major bills were proposed in the Senate during the 11 0 th

45E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1450-51 (Apr. 2, 2007); Brief for the Petitioners
at 2, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (Apr. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/06-07/05-1120petitioners.pdf; Stephanie I. Cohen,
Supreme Court Wades into Global Warming Debate, MARKETWATCH, Nov. 29, 2006,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/supreme-court-wades-global-warming/story.aspx?guid=%7B
358B1048-099E-4651-8B66-BBBE3AOA91 1C%7D.
46E.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005,42 U.S.C. §§ 15801-16524 (2005).
47Safe Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 1590, 110th Cong. (2007).
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draft.48

Congress, with a fifth being circulated as a discussion
All four of
the bills call for some type of mandatory cap-and-trade program for
greenhouse gas emissions. The shared goal of the bills is to create a
trading program, and thus, market incentives, to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.
Similar bills by the likes of John Kerry and Barbara Boxer have been
proposed in Congress in the past. 49 However, the 10th Session is
characterized by more rigorous proposals and mounting political
momentum to act decisively. As time passes and concern over climate
change grows, it becomes increasingly apparent that "[o]ne of these
measures, or a blend of them, stands an excellent chance of passage in this
Congress or the next."5 °
As the 2008 U.S. Presidential race looms, politicians are becoming
emboldened to discuss climate change and propose federal legislation to
limit U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Climate change is nowhere near
becoming a bipartisan issue, as many environmental issues were in the
1970s. It is unlikely that the Senate will ever approve a major piece of
environmental legislation unanimously, as it did in 1970 when it passed the
Clean Air Act. However, unanimity is not necessary. Climate change is
still politically divisive, but it has the potential to garner enough support to
break the current congressional deadlock.
Federal initiatives, however, constitute only a fraction of the legal and
political actions underway to address climate change in the United States.
Climate change is unique among other environmental issues in that the
federal government is not leading domestic efforts to craft a robust legal
framework. Parts IV and V explore the role of sub-federal governments,
litigation, regulation, and extra-legal mechanisms in influencing the
direction of U.S. climate change law and policy-making.

48 See PEW CENTER FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, SENATE GREENHOUSE
GAS CAP-ANDTRADE PROPOSALS: INCLUDES LEGISLATION INTRODUCED IN THE 110th CONGRESS AS OF AUGUST 2,

2007 (2007) available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Economy-wide%20bills%20110th%
20Senate%20-%2OAugust/202_O.pdf; see also PEW CENTER FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, SENATE
GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE PROPOSALS IN THE 110th CONGRESS (2007) available at

http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Cap-and-trade%20bills%20110th_Feb5.pdf.
49See the full text of the previous version of the Bill. S.3698, 110th Cong. (2007) (A bill
to
amend the Clean Air Act to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, and for other purposes, as introduced
by Senator Jeffords); Environmental Defense Fund, Climate Change Bills of the 110 Congress,
http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=1075 (last visited May 12, 2008) (providing an overview of bills
proposed in the 10th Congress, including renewed and updated proposals by Senators Boxer and
Kerry).
50Felicity Barringer & Andrew C. Revkin, Bills on Climate Move to Spotlight in the New
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,2007, at A-24, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
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IV. SUB-FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW & POLICY-MAKING IN THE
UNITED STATES

States consistently have been the "laboratories of democracy" 51 in the
United States. In the field of environmental law and policy, and beyond,
states have often been the test grounds for new modes of law and
regulation. It has long been recognized that sub-federal legislation can
"function as a catalyst for regulatory action by higher jurisdictional levels
of government., 52 Thus, federal environmental regulation mimicking state
regulation is not a new phenomenon. Rarely, however, have states-either
directly or indirectly-embarked on such a widespread and coordinated
campaign to develop effective environmental laws in the absence of federal
leadership as in the current case of climate change regulation.
Traditional economic theory would argue against the rationality of
independent or regional state efforts to regulate the global commons in the
absence of national coordination and oversight to prevent problems of
competitive disadvantage.53 Nevertheless, the flurry of activity at the state
level is undeniable. States have adopted a variety of legal, regulatory and
policy measures to address climate change: forty-two states have
greenhouse gas inventories; twenty-nine states have adopted climate action
plans; fourteen states have adopted greenhouse gas emission targets;
thirteen states are in the process of adopting greenhouse gas emission
standards for automobiles; six states have mandatory greenhouse gas
reporting programs; twenty states have formed climate change advisory
boards; and twenty-five states are participating in one or more of eight
existing regional climate change initiatives.54 In addition, sixteen states
have public benefit funds for clean energy supply, and twenty-four states
have renewable energy portfolio standards.55
The impetus for widespread state action is not immediately apparent.
The driving force may be genuine concern for a global environmental
problem that threatens the health and well-being of state citizenry, the
desire to garner the political support and good will of concerned
51See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory .... ).
52 Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional
Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 64 (2006).
53 See generally Engel & Saleska, supra note 17 (arguing that differences between the global
commons and the standard concept of commons suggest unilateral action is not irrational).
54 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE AND REGIONAL CLIMATE ACTIONS
(last visited Mar.
TABLES, http://epa.gov/climatechange/wycd/stateandlocalgov/stateactionslist.htm
18, 2008) (information current as of June 2007) [hereinafter CLIMATE ACTIONS TABLES]. Greenhouse
gas inventories are currently one of the most popular ways with which states seek to engage with the
climate change debate. Engel & Saleska, supranote 17, at 216.
55

U.S.

ENVTL.

PROT.

AGENCY,

CLEAN

ENERGY:

STATE

BEST

PRACTICES,

http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-programs/state-and-local/state-best-practices.html
Mar. 18, 2008) (information current as of Jan. 1, 2007).

(last visited
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constituencies, or the idea that state actions will eventually create models
for the federal government to use in creating a comprehensive climate
change framework and, thus, "trigger regulatory action by governments
that contribute a larger percentage of global greenhouse gas emissions. ' 56
Genuine concern, political maneuvering, and prompting of federal action
are not mutually exclusive drivers. States are likely motivated by all of
these factors to different degrees. The relative importance of political
motivations is not always clear. Unlike federal regulation, which has been
extensively researched and written about, state regulation has received far
less attention and analysis, particularly in the context of environmental
law.57 Thus, there is very little data suggesting why states adopt particular
environmental regulatory strategies. What is clear, however, is that a
variety of factors are driving U.S. states to act in the absence of a federal
mandate.
Facing apparent federal reluctance to address climate change, states
such as California and New York are choosing to follow in the footsteps of
foreign governments, such as the European Community and many of its
Member States, to try and create robust climate change laws and policies.
The policies and ideologies of these state and local entities increasingly
have more in common with one another and with European nations than
they do with their own national government. Leaving the U.S. federal
government standing still, these cosmopolitan states and cities are moving
forward by learning from one another and mimicking climate change
experiences from abroad.
The following section reviews several case studies that reveal how
U.S. state and local policy-makers are finding ways to implement climate
change laws and policies, and examines how these initiatives promote
tangible steps towards developing a comprehensive legal and political
climate change regime in the United States.
A. Overview of State Climate Change Policy
As early as 1997, states began addressing global climate change.
Oregon initiated state policy-making efforts when, in 1997, Governor of
Oregon, John Kitzhaber, passed the first law in the nation setting carbon
dioxide standards for new energy facilities in the state. 58 And, in 2000,
New Jersey established state-wide targets for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions based on voluntary public and private programs. 59 A year later,
56 Engel,
57 PAUL

supranote 52, at 64.

TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 8 (2004).

58 PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE,
(2003),
available at
http://www.ppionline.org/ppi-ci.cfin?knIgArealD=116&subseclD=900039

&contentlD=251285.
59Rachel L. Chanin, Note, California'sAuthority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas
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in 2001, Massachusetts upped the ante by becoming the first state to
establish mandatory carbon dioxide emissions caps for power plants.60
Massachusetts's regulation mandates that "the six largest and dirtiest
power plants" in the state cut sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions
by 50-70%, and carbon dioxide emissions by 10%, as well as reducing
mercury releases. 6' Thus, by 2001, Massachusetts had managed to do what
the federal government still has no plans to do--regulate carbon dioxide
emissions.
In setting limits on greenhouse gas emissions, numerous states,
including California, Texas, and Massachusetts, have implemented
standards for increasing the amount of electricity generated from
renewable energy sources.62 States are also taking the lead in developing
methods for identifying and tracking stationary and mobile sources of
greenhouse gas emissions.
These are just a few examples of how states are adopting measures to
address global climate change by curbing greenhouse gas emissions;
numerous other states have adopted or plan to adopt greenhouse gas
emission regulations, including New York, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Florida, and Illinois, to name a few.63 States are also taking a
leading role in addressing greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles,
going so far as to adopt legislation that exceeds the minimum regulatory
requirements set by the U.S. Clean Air Act.64
The emergent role of states in setting climate change policy reflects
growing awareness of how climate change will affect state economies and
natural environments, including "the likely effects of climate change on
agriculture, forestry, the availability of water, public health, and other areas
of traditional state responsibility." 65 In response to these concerns, states
are beginning to take independent and collaborative action to address
climate change.
B. Regional Climate Change Initiatives
Individual states, especially keystone states such as California and
New York, create legislative models and regional momentum for
addressing environmental problems. In the context of a problem of the
global commons, however, independent state action can only go so far to
address the problem. Collective action can exponentially increase the
Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699, 701 (2003).
60 PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., supra note 58.
61 Chanin, supra note 59, at 702.
62

PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., supra note 58.

63 Chanin,

supra note 59, at 702.
See generally Chanin, supranote 59 (examining California's action).
65 John C. Dembach, Introduction, Symposium: Facing Climate Change: Opportunities and Tools
for States, 14 WIDENER L.J. 1, 2 (2004).
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effectiveness of single state responses and "may function as a mechanism
by which individual governments can help trigger the implementation of
the preferred solution" at the federal and/or international level.66
Recognizing the benefits of collective action, states are joining forces
to create regional climate change partnerships. Currently, twenty-five
states are collaborating on eight major regional climate change initiatives.
On-going regional collaborations include: New England Governors
Climate Change Action Plan (NEG-ECP), Western Governors' Association
Clean and Diversified Energy Initiative, Southwest Climate Change
Initiative (SCCI), West Coast Governors' Global Warming Initiative,
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), The Climate Registry,
Western Regional Climate Action Initiative, and "Powering the Plains"
Initiative.67 The discussion that follows provides several brief examples of
the type of regional partnerships that exist and the role of these initiatives
in shaping U.S. climate change policy.
C. The Climate ChangeAction Plan
In 2000, the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern
Canadian Premiers (NEG/ECP) passed Resolution 25-9, which created the
regional Climate Change Action Plan.68 The Climate Change Action Plan
establishes three primary goals: "(1) [r]educe regional greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels by 2010," "(2) [r]educe regional greenhouse gas
emissions by at least 10% below 1990 levels by 2020," and (3) reduce
regional greenhouse
gas emissions to 75-85% below current levels in the
69
long-term.

The Climate Change Action Plan exemplifies how regional
partnerships, in the absence of strong national programs, can devise
innovative trans-boundary mechanisms for addressing climate change and
how regional compacts can prompt states to integrate the commitments of
the compact into legislation. For example, following the adoption of the
Plan, Maine implemented the Maine Act to Provide Leadership in
Addressing the Threat of Climate Change, which translates the Plan's
overarching commitments and certain action items into legal obligations.7 °
66
67 Engel & Saleska, supra note 17, at 184.

CLIMATE ACTIONS TABLES, supra note 54.

6'

THE COMM. ON THE ENV'T & THE NORTHEAST INT'L COMM. ON ENERGY, CONF. NEW

ENGLAND GOVERNORS & EASTERN CANADIAN PREMIERS, CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 2001, at I

(Aug. 28, 2001), available at http://www.negc.org/documents/NEG-ECP%/20CCAP.PDF [hereinafter
CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 2001]. The member states of the New England Governors' Climate
Change Action Plan include: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Vermont. The New England Governors' Conference, Inc., http://negc.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
69 CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 2001, supra note 68, at 7.
70 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 574-79 (suppl. 2007). Massachusetts and New Hampshire
have also taken concrete steps to integrate their regional commitments into state policy. McKinstry, Jr.,
supra note 19, at 35-39.
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D. West Coast Governors' Global Warming Initiative
The West Coast Governors' Global Warming Initiative, launched in
2003, commits California, Oregon and Washington "to act individually and
regionally to reduce greenhouse gas emissions below current levels". 7' In
2004, the three Governors approved a series of recommendations designed
to improve regional efforts to address global climate change; they also
committed to adopting more concrete obligations at the state and regional
levels.72
Cooperative efforts on the part of California, Washington and Oregon
are not of minor consequence. If these three states were a nation, their
cumulative greenhouse gas emissions would rank the region as the seventh
highest emitter in the world.73
E. Southwest Climate Change Initiative
Similarly, in 2006, Arizona and New Mexico launched the Southwest
Climate Change Initiative. The initiative establishes a framework for the
two states to collaborate to identify options for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions and promoting climate change mitigation, energy efficient
technologies, and clean energy sources.74 The Initiative does not create
any legally binding commitments, but it facilitates cooperation between
Arizona and New Mexico and has already prompted concrete legal changes
at the state level in both states.
F. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is
effort by nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states to
"[d]evelop a multi-state cap-and-trade program covering
(GHG) emissions. 75 The RGGI was initiated by New

a more diverse
collaborate to
greenhouse gas
York Governor

71Press Release, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, West Coast States Strengthen Joint Climate Protection
Strategy, (Nov. 18, 2004), http://www.ef.org/westcoastclimate/WCClimate.pdf.
72 Id.

73WEST COAST GOVERNORS' GLOBAL WARMING INITIATIVE STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE

GOVERNORS 4 (2004), http://www.ef.org/westcoastclimate/WCGGWINov_04%20Report.pdf.
74 Press Release, State of Ariz. Executive Office, Governor Janet Napolitano, Governors
Napolitano and Richardson Launch Southwest Climate Change Initiative (Feb. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.azclimatechange.gov/download/O40F8086.pdf.
75Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/about.htm (last visited
Mar. 24, 2008); see also Christine Van Lenten, New York Tackles Climate Change: Promoting
Renewable Energy and Capping Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. ACADEMY SCI. (Oct. 20, 2005),

http://sallan.org/nyas/NYAS-Climate-Change-preBriefingSallan.pdf. The states participating in the
RGGI include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont;
Maryland is due to become the eighth formal member of the RGGI by June 2007. Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Participating States, http://www.rggi.org/states.htn (last visited Mar. 24,
2008). In addition to the member states, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, the Eastern Canadian Provinces, and New Brunswick participate as observers to the RGGI. Id.
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George Pataki in April 2003. Governor Pataki's initiative capitalizes on
growing interest in greenhouse gas trading programs and the reality that a
healthy market for carbon dioxide emissions will benefit from bringing
together multiple states to cover more power plants and, thus, more
emissions.
G. Powering the PlainsInitiative
The Powering the Plains Initiative (PPI) is a public-private coalition
that brings together North and South Dakota, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin
and Manitoba to create a sustainable energy future for the Plains region. 76
The PPI facilitates voluntary efforts to create regional economic
opportunities for the energy and agricultural sectors while simultaneously
addressing the causes and consequences of climate change.7 7 For example,
the PPI is developing regional principles for energy efficiency, production
and transmission, and creating a regional strategy for reducing carbon
dioxide emissions eighty percent from 1990 levels by 2050.78 The PPI
serves the important role of bringing together interested parties across
traditional private-public sector lines. The PPI facilitates dialogue on the
most effective and economical ways to address climate change in a coal
and agriculture-heavy region of the country, and it creates a forum for
launching new enterprises and pilot programs. The PPI also coordinates
and promotes the implementation of mandatory legislation and resolutions
within its member states.
The diffusion of state and regional collaboration to previously reticent
areas of the country-due in large part to resource and economic
constraints-suggests that, nation-wide, states are beginning to recognize
the importance of creating models for easing the social and economic
burdens associated with climate change.
H. Western Regional Climate Action Initiative
Most recently, in February 2007, the Governors of Arizona, New
Mexico, Oregon, Washington and California came together-bridging the
pre-existing Southwest Climate Change Initiative and West Coast Global
Warming Initiative-to form the Western Regional Climate Action
Initiative. 79 The Governors of the five states committed to setting regional
76

The PPI "brings together top elected and government officials, utility industry executives,

agricultural producers and farm organization representatives, and renewable energy advocates." Great
Plains Institute, Powering the Plains, http://www.gpisd.net/resource.html?Id=61#au (last visited Mar.
21, 2008) [hereinafter Great Plains Institute]; see also Engel, supra note 52, at 67 (describing the PPI).
77Great Plains Institute, supra note 76.
78Id.
79 Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Regional Initiatives: Western Climate Initiative,

http://www.pewclimate.org/what-s-beingdone/in-the-states/regional-initiatives.cfin
Mar. 21,2008).
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emission reduction goals, developing a regional cap and trade program and
creating a regional GHG registry system.8 0
The governors further
committed to collaborative efforts to promote renewable energy, improve
energy efficiency, and develop adaptation strategies.
I. Regional Initiatives in Review
The Western Regional Climate Action Initiative, like its counterparts
across the country, takes advantage of individual strengths to create a
strong regional block, which creates economic, political, and absolute
emission reduction advantages. From an economic perspective, regional
cooperation allows states to take advantage of economies of scale in
encouraging the development of markets in energy efficiency products,
clean and renewable sources of energy-and energy infrastructure. In
addition, regional cooperation facilitates a larger, more viable market for
cap and trade emission reduction programs. Thus, from an economic
perspective, the regional approach "allows the states involved to capitalize
upon their shared environmental resources and interconnected economies
both to elevate the importance of climate measures and to address climate
change in a cost-effective manner. ' '8' Regional initiatives also create
greater regulatory uniformity, which allows greater emission reductions
and reduces opposition from industry. Politically, when states operate in
regional blocks, they have strength in numbers; their actions put more
pressure on other states to establish similar programs--or lose competitive
advantages and, possibly, the political good will of their citizenry.
Equally, burgeoning regional efforts put pressure on the federal
government to respond. The state and regional programs, again, serve as
the "laboratories" for the federal government; the regional programs create
feasible models that the federal legislature can adopt to address climate
change. State and regional actions, thus, "function as a catalyst
for
82
regulatory action by higher jurisdictional levels of government."
The Western Governors summed up the situation well, saying, "[i]n
the absence of meaningful federal action, it is up to the States to take
action to address climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in
this country" 83 and to create "a model and example for the rest of the
so

Western

Regional

Climate

Action

Initiative,

available

at

http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/documents/2007-02-26-WesternClimateAgreementFinal.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 15, 2007); see also Press Release, Governors of Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona,
& New Mexico, Five Western Governors Announce Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Agreement,
(Feb. 26, 2007), available at http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/pdf/letters/022607NGA.pdf [hereinafter
Five Western Governors Press Release].
81Engel, supra note 52, at 70.
2
1d. at 64.
83 Five Western Governors Press Release, supra note 80 (quoting Arizona Governor Janet
Napolitano).
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nation. ' 84
Regional cooperation does much more than create climate initiatives in
name only. By maximizing geographic scope, taking advantage of
economies of scale, cultivating widespread public and private support, and
demonstrating the viability of legal and political measures, regional
agreements promote substantive change while simultaneously providing
symbolic demonstrations of the political and technological viability of
climate change measures.
J. California-ARegional Powerhouse of its Own
California is recognized nationally and internationally as a driving
force in state, regional and national climate change policy-making.
California has taken an early and bold role in tackling climate change
at the state level. In 2001, California created a Climate Action Registry,
creating a record of greenhouse gas emission baselines for registrants. 5
The Registry began operating in 2002; it currently has in excess of 100
participants and is "arguably the most comprehensive [registry], as
participants register all of their GHG emissions for operations in
California; other state (and federal) registries cover only emission
reductions. 86
California was only warming up when it created its voluntary registry.
On July 22, 2002, the former governor of California, Gray Davis, approved
legislation that would ultimately make California the87first U.S. state to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.
K. California'sGreenhouse Gas Emissions Law
California's legislation is nationally-and internationally--cuttingedge. The legislation requires that "no later than January 1, 2005, the state
board shall develop and adopt regulations that achieve the maximum
feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles. 88 While an earlier Assembly version of the bill regulated
only carbon dioxide, prior to adoption, the bill was amended in the Senate
to include all greenhouse gases-such broad coverage is still rare among
greenhouse gas emission reduction legislation worldwide.8 9 California's
greenhouse gas regulations were to take effect on January 1, 2006 and
84 Id. (quoting Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski).
85 S.B. 1771 (Cal. 2000); S.B. 527 (Cal. 2001).
86 JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CLIMATE CHANGE: ACTION BY STATES
TO
ADDRESS
GREENHOUSE
GAS
EMISSIONS
10
(Jan.
18,
2007),
available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80733.pdf. Registry systems are currently being used in
New Hampshire, California, and Wisconsin.
87. Assemb. B. 1493 (Cal. 2002); see also Chanin, supra note 59, at 705-06.
88 Assemb. B. 1493, 3(a) (Cal. 2002).
89Assemb. B. 1058, 2(a) (Cal. Amended 2001).
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were only to apply to motor vehicles manufactured in or after the 2009
model year that were to be sold in California.9"
Despite its geographic confines, California's legislation has significant
national implications. To begin, the legislation is significantly more
progressive than national efforts to combat climate change. In fact, the
legislation runs contrary to President Bush's current climate change and air
quality policies, which focus on voluntary agreements rather than
mandatory regulation and which have retreated from rather than expanded
or enforced existing federal air pollution laws, such as the Clean Air Act. 91
Further, California has always played the role of trailblazer in the field of
environmental law. This legislation is no different. As in the past,
California's efforts have served as a catalyst for other states to adopt
similar climate change policies. Ten other states have already adopted
similar greenhouse gas emissions legislation for automobilesrepresenting a paramount case of how progressive
state action can produce
92
a ripple effect on nation-wide policy-making.
California's greenhouse gas legislation is a practical and a political
catalyst. It sets measurable, progressive emission reduction goals and
demonstrates the "growing effort by local, state and foreign governments
93
to seize the initiative since President Bush has been reluctant to act."
Proponents of the legislation candidly expressed their frustration with the
federal government's failure to address climate change and suggested that
California is seeking to fill the void and lead the way towards more
progressive policies nationwide.9 4
Frustrated with the absence of
leadership at the national level, California is initiating state and regional
action. California's greenhouse gas legislation demonstrates the increasing
importance of state actions in the area of environmental policy-making and
states' growing willingness to adopt policies that surpass existing national
policies.
On its own, California can exert political pressure and make emission
reduction gains. As was demonstrated in the previous discussion of
regional collaborations, however, California is not trying to go it on its
own. Instead, Governor Schwarzenegger is coupling California's statewide efforts with multiple regional partnerships that seek to expand the
geographic, economic, and political scope of sub-national climate change
90Chanin, supranote 59, at 705-06.
9'See Global Climate Change Policy Book, supra note 32 (detailing various policy initiatives);
Sierra Club, Waiting to Inhale: Bush Administration Policies Mean More Dirty Air,
http://www.sierraclub.org/cleanair/factsheets/air-bush-adminsummary.pdf (last visited Mar. 24,
2008).
92 RAMSEUR, supra note 86, at 14. States adopting similar regulations include Oregon,
Washington, and eight states in the Northeast. Id
" See Chanin, supra note 59, at 703 (citing Gary Polakovic, Assembly Bill Targets Global
Warming Trend, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at 2-1, availableat LEXIS, News Library, LAT File).
94Id.at 702-03.
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policies. And, it is these growing, politically concerted efforts that begin
to distinguish state-led climate change policy-making from the previous
model of states as laboratories for federal policy-making. In the context of
climate change, states are not merely taking individual action to develop
unique tools; they are banding together to improve the physical and
political efficacy of their efforts.
In the words of one prominent
commentator, there is a "stealth-like" effort by state level politicians to
create enough political momentum to overcome federal inertia.
California's efforts-especially its attempts to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from automobiles-have met with resistance from multiple
sectors. The ultimate success of California's climate change regulations,
as well as the efforts by other states that have adopted similar policies,
remains tenuous for two primary reasons.
First, California is in the unusual position of having provisional
authority from the EPA to draft automobile pollution standards that are
more stringent than existing federal requirements, under the CAA. 95 In
order to do so, however, California must obtain specific permission from
the EPA. The request for this necessary permission is still pending.
Further, the law granting California conditional authority to implement
more stringent standards also allows other states to opt to follow
California's more stringent provisions.9 6
However, without EPA's
approval neither California nor any other states will be able to adopt more
stringent provisions. Thus, there are on-going state-federal politics that
could ultimately block California's attempts to create a pathway for
progressive regulation of automobile greenhouse gas emissions.
Second, California faces on-going legal challenges to its auto emission
regulations, which will be discussed in more detail in Part V. Even before
former Governor Davis signed the legislation into law, major automakers
expressed entrenched opposition to the bill, fearing that it would cost
billions of dollars to manufacture vehicles that meet California emission
standards. 97 The automakers also opposed the creation of a multi-tiered
regulatory regime, where they would face different regulatory
requirements from state to state. Amidst growing industrial opposition, in
January 2005, thirteen California car dealerships and the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers98 filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in
95RAMSEUR, supra note 86, at 14 (citing Clean Air Act § 209,42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2000)).
%
97 Id. (citing Clean Air Act § 177,42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2000)).
See Danny Hakim, Automakers Sue to Block Emissions Law in California,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2004,
available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E05EED91231F93B
A3575 ICIA9629C8B63; Cat Lazaroff, CaliforniaLaw Will Limit C02 Emissions From Cars, ENVTL.
NEWS SERV., July 22, 2002, available at http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/ju12002/2002-07-2206.asp.
9' Carolyn Whetzel, California Files to Dismiss Industry Suit Challenging Gas Emission
Regulations,
DAILY
ENV'T
REP.,
Mar.
10,
2005,
at
A- 1,
http://pubs.bna.corn/NWSSTND/IP/BNA/den.nsf/SearchAllView/6939B08F48FEB6C 185256FC000 13
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Fresno alleging that California's legislation violates federal fuel economy
laws and seeking to block the legislation from coming into effect in 2006. 99
The lawsuit involves a dispute between the State of California and
private entities. However, it highlights a more fundamental dividebetween states and the federal government. In October 2002, even before
the lawsuit was filed, the Department of Justice expressed support for the
decision by the automobile industry to challenge California's program to
promote low-emission vehicles.'tu The Department of Justice went so far
as to offer a legal brief in support of the automakers' challenge, alleging
01
that California's regulation encroached on federal regulatory authority.
As will be discussed in more detail in Part V, a decision on the merits
of this case was issued in December 2007. The decision, on December 11,
2007 by Judge Ishii for the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California, upheld the legitimacy of California's greenhouse gas
tailpipe standards pending California's ability to obtain the necessary
waiver of pre-emption under the CAA section 209 from the EPA,'0 2 which
has since proved the catching point.
As will also be discussed further Part V, the suit and EPA's subsequent
decision to deny a CAA waiver has evoked an impassioned battle that pits
the progressive policy-makers within the State of California-supported by
its sister states that have adopted similar legislation-against not only the
auto industry but also against the forces within the federal government that
oppose binding climate change policies. Nevertheless, all indicators
suggest that California is not backing down from its commitment to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions.
Defying the ongoing legal and political opposition from the automobile
industry, on September 20, 2006, Bill Lockyer, then California Attorney
General, filed a nuisance lawsuit against key United States and Japanese
auto manufacturers. In the suit, Lockyer alleges that the defendants'
"vehicles' emissions have contributed significantly to global warming,
1922?O. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers is a Washington-based trade group that represents
nine automakers, including General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota , BMW, Mercedes-Benz, U.S.A.,
Mazda, Mitsubishi Motors, Porsche, and Volkswagen of America. Auto Alliance Home Page,
http://www.autoalliance.org/. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and a group of Central
Valley automobile dealers sued the California Air Resources Board in December 2004, alleging the
agency overstepped its authority in adopting the regulations. Whetzel, supra. The Association of
International Automobile Manufacturers joined the lawsuit in February 2005. Id.
9 See Carmakers Sue over Clean Cars Law: California's Groundbreaking Law Cuts Global
Warming Pollution and Improves Air Quality, Envtl. Defense Fund, Jan. 13, 2005,
http://www.edf.org/article.cfin?contentid=4192 ("Not long after California established the nation's
toughest clean car standards, the auto industry moved to block them with a lawsuit.").
10o
Rabe, supra note 18, at 148 (citing Tom Doggett, White House, EPA Clash on Lower Vehicle
Emissions, REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 15, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, REUNWS File).
101 Id.
02 Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep Inc. v. Goldstone, No. CV F 04-6663, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
91309, at **l 11-12 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11,2007).
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harmed the resources, infrastructure and environmental health of
California, and cost the state millions of dollars to address current and
future efforts."' 0 3 The complaint alleges that, under both state and federal
law, automakers have created a public nuisance by manufacturing
automobiles that emit massive quantities of carbon dioxide that contributes
to global warming, which has "already injured California, its environment,
its economy, and the health and well-being of its citizens. ' 04 Shortly
following the filing of the lawsuit, the Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss. And, on September 17, 2007, Judge Martin J. Jenkins for the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California granted the motion to
dismiss based on the court's finding that the case raised0 non-justiciable
5
political questions beyond the limits of court's jurisdiction.'
Despite this finding, the Attorney General's office-now manned by
Attorney General Edmund G. Brown, Jr.-is pushing forward with other
lawsuits relating to climate change. 106 This lawsuit was only one of several
filed against the EPA,'0 7 the Bush Administration,'0 8 the National Highway
Traffic Safety Agency, 10 9 and the transport industry to address the "Bush
' 10
Administration's inaction on global warming."
California's automobile greenhouse gas emission reduction regulations
and its judicial activism are "neither merely symbolic""' nor
inconsequential in terms of potential emission reductions. 1 2 The
regulations are concrete, mandatory, enforceable and far-reaching.
Further, the automobile regulations constitute only one element of
California's burgeoning portfolio of climate change policies. This initial
effort has lead to the implementation of subsequent climate change laws
103Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, State of California, Department of Justice,
Attorney General Lockyer Files Lawsuit Against "Big Six" Automakers for Global Warming Damages
in California (Sept. 20, 2006), availableat http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1338 [hereinafter
Lockyer Press Release]. The autornakers targeted in the complaint include, GM, Toyota, Ford, Honda,
Chrysler, and Nissan. California v. GM Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007).
104Lockyer Press Release, supra note 103 (quoting the complaint). U.S. District Judge Martin
Jenkins of San Francisco scheduled a hearing for March 6 to consider the automakers' request to
dismiss the suit. Bob Egelko, State Won't Drop Auto Industry Emissions Suit, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 2,
2007, at BI, availableat LEXIS, News Library, SFCHRN File.
105 California v. General Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. WL 2726871,
at *16
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
106Office of the Attorney General, State of California, Department of Justice, http://ag.ca.gov.
107
E.g., Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
108
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508 (9th Cir.
2007).
109
E.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508 (9th
Cir. 2007).
110Lockyer Press Release, supra note 103.

. BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY xii (2004).

112 See Engel, supra note 52, at 56 (noting that California's standards along with other
state
standards would result in "emissions reductions of approximately I to 1.5% below 'business as usual'
by 2015-2020").

HeinOnline -- 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1376 2007-2008

2008]

CLIMATE CHANGE PRESSURE-COOKER

and policies.
L. Recent Climate Change Activities in California
Despite ongoing resistance, California is pushing on with its climate
change agenda. In April 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger signed an
executive order establishing targets for bioenergy use and production as
part of California's Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)." 3
The
Governor followed the executive order in July 2006 with a Bioenergy
Action Plan, "outlin[ing] ways for California to bring alternative energy
into the mainstream and reduce dependency on foreign fossil fuels" and
committing "state agencies to take detailed actions 1within
a specific
' 14
timeframe to advance the use of bioenergy in California."
Then, in August 2006, the Governor expanded California's range of
renewable energy initiatives by signing Senate Bill 1, which implements
final portions of his "Million Solar Roofs" project, which aims to create
one million new solar roofs for California by 2018.11s Subsequently, on
September 27, 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law Assembly
Bill 32 ("AB 32").l 1 6 AB 32 sets an enforceable cap on greenhouse gas
emissions. 17 It requires California to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions
to 1990 levels by the year 2020 (a twenty-five percent reduction), and to
reduce emissions to eighty percent below 1990 levels by 2050.118
California's AB 32 mirrors the most rigorous Climate Change bills
proposed in the 10th Congress and embodies many of the emissions
reduction goals long advocated by environmental groups. The bill relies
on both regulatory and market mechanisms to achieve its goals.
Mandatory caps will begin in 2012 and will be incrementally ratcheted

113Exec. Order S-06-06, Office of the Governor, State of California, (April 25, 2006) availableat

http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/executive-order/183/ (last visited March 16, 2007); see also Press Release,
Office of the Governor, State of California, Gov. Schwarzenegger Announces Bioenergy Action Plan
for California (July 13, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/1 685 [hereinafter
Bioenergy Action Plan].
114Bioenergy Action Plan, supra note 113.
115Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of California, Schwarzenegger Signs Legislation
to Complete Million Solar Roofs Plan (Aug. 21, 2006), availableat http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/pressrelease/3588.
116Assemb. B. 32 (Cal. 2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501 (West 2007).
117 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38550, 38580(a).
11t
Id.§ 38550; Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of California, Gov. Schwarzenegger
Signs Landmark Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006) [hereinafter
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions], available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/41 11
(announcing the passage of Assembly Bill 32); see also Fact Sheet, Office of the Governor, State of
California, Governor Establishes World's First Low Carbon Standard for Transportation Fuels, Sets
Stage for National and International Action, available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/fact-sheet/5465/
(last visited Mar. 20, 2008) (detailing an executive order, passed by the Governor on January 18, 2007
that will "support AB 32 emissions targets as part of California's overall strategy to fight global
warming").
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down to meet the 2020 goals." 9 AB 32 puts California at the forefront of
national and international climate change policy-making.
In early 2007, California continued to construct its climate change
policy framework. On January 18, 2007, Governor Schwarzenegger
signed an executive order establishing a Low Carbon Fuel Standard for all
transport fuels sold in California. 20 A week later, on January 25, 2007, the
California Public Utilities Commission stepped into the unwelcoming
territory of electricity producers and providers by banning California's
largest utilities from buying electricity from high-polluting sources,
including most coal-burning power plants.' 2' This action was taken to
comply with AB 32, which requires the Commission to adopt emissions
standards for utilities. 122 Although there are few coal-burning plants in
California, about twenty percent of the state's power comes from coal
plants in other Western
states, making the CPUC's decision potentially
23
politically divisive.
California is undoubtedly serving as a leader in the movement to
address climate change at the sub-national level in the United States.
Equally, California is implementing laws and policies that mirror the most
progressive policies being implemented worldwide. Neither the political
nor pragmatic value of California's climate change policy framework
should be underestimated. In the battles to address political stagnation in
federal environmental policy and to address the physical manifestations of
climate change, California is leading the way.
M. State Climate Change Laws andPolicies:A Review
California is by no means the only state adopting a portfolio of climate
119
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 118.
120
Office of the Governor, State of California, Exec. Order No. S-01-07 (2007), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0l07.pdf; Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of
California, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Executive Order Establishing World's First Low Carbon
Standard for Transportation Fuels (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/pressrelease/5174/.

.2.Associated Press, CaliforniaRegulators Vote to Ban Utilitiesfrom Buying "Dirty" Power,
INT'L

HERALD

TRIB.,

Jan.

25,

2007,

available

at

http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/25/america/NA-GEN-US-Dirty-Power.php
[hereinafter
California Regulators]; Joe Shaulis, California Regulation Forbids Utilities From Buying 'Dirty'
Electricity, JURIST, Jan. 27, 2007, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/01/californiaregulation-forbids.php.
122CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530(b)(2) (West 2007).
123

California Regulators, supra note 121.

California is not the only state that is regulating

electricity purchasing/production. Oregon, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Washington State
regulate-or are in the process of regulating---carbon dioxide emissions from electric power
generators. Engel & Saleski, supra note 17, at 221. For example, in 2002, Washington passed a law
that requires new power plants to "offset twenty percent of their carbon dioxide emissions by planting

trees, buying natural gas-powered buses or taking other steps to cure such emissions." Id.(citation
omitted). While the Washington law only applies to new builds, both New Hampshire and
Massachusetts have put in place laws that regulate carbon dioxide emissions from existing power
plants. Engel & Saleski, supra note 17, at 221.
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change policies. Many of the New England, West Coast and Southwestern
states are incrementally creating comprehensive state-level climate change
programs. All in all almost two dozen states have some type of renewable
energy obligation, and over a dozen states have enacted or are124in the
process of enacting legislation to control greenhouse gas emissions.
Despite prodigious efforts on the part of California and the Northeast
and increasingly bold state and regional partnerships across the United
States, not all states are following suit. Many states continue to resist
regulating greenhouse gases, prioritizing economic and social well-being
over climate change concerns. 25 Some traditionally fossil fuel-heavy
states, such as Texas, have enacted limited climate change policies but are
delving into renewable energy industries as new sources of economic
opportunity. 126 Other states are outwardly hostile towards climate change
policy-making and specifically avoid or negate efforts to adopt binding
limits on greenhouse gas emissions or mandatory renewable energy
programs. 12 Those states stalling or actively opposing progressive climate
change policies are exceptions to the norm. On the whole, the discernible
trend is for states-for political, economic, environmental, or strategic
reasons-to adopt a range of climate change policies that promote
renewable energy and to inventory, register, and-increasingly-limit
greenhouse gas emissions.
Sub-national activity is particularly remarkable for three reasons: (1)
the breadth and diversity of state-level action; (2) the growing number and
variety of regional partnerships; and (3) the persistent increase of state and
regional activity in the face of federal inactivity and even, at times,
resistance.
At the individual state level, California's leadership in limiting
emissions from automobiles offers real possibilities for widespread
emissions reductions. If successfully implemented and mimicked by other
states, this single piece of legislation could eventually control emissions
for up to one-fourth of the United States light-duty vehicle market. 12 8 This
is no small feat since transport is the second fastest growing sector for
greenhouse gas emission growth. 29 In a more dispersed manner, however,
the efforts of numerous small and medium size states to encourage and/or
124Engel & Saleski, supra note 17, at 218.
125See RABE, supra note 111, at xii-xiii, 47-49

(describing the apparent indifference of Louisiana

and Florida to reducing greenhouse gases).
126 See, e.g., id. at 49-62 (detailing Texas's enactment of legislation mandating increased
generation of renewable energy for economic reasons).
.27See id. at 40-47 (describing the hostility of Michigan and Colorado toward environmental
regulation).
128Engel & Saleska, supra note 17, at 212.
129 DAVID L. GREENE & ANDREAS SCHAFER, SOLUTIONS: REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSION

FROM

U.S.

TRANSPORTATION,

at

iii

(2003),

gec.org/information/briefing/9.pdf.
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mandate renewable energy
obligations also offers potential for discernible
0
emissions reductions.13
While it is imperative that individual states continue to develop,
implement and enforce state-level policies to modify energy use and
production and to limit greenhouse gas emissions, regional partnerships
offer important advantages of scale. Regional cooperation "allows the
states involved to capitalize upon their shared environmental resources and
interconnected economies both to elevate the importance of climate
measures and to address climate change in a cost-effective manner.' 13' By
working together, states pool economic, geographic and political resources
to improve the efficacy of their programs and to magnify the legal and
political significance of their actions.
While state and regional programs have developed in a stealth-like
manner-and this has been advantageous in many ways-they are now
reaching a critical mass. As climate change laws and policies multiply, so
does the political pressure exerted at the federal level for comparable, if
not superior action.
N. Local Climate Change Laws and Policies
In the recent flurry of attention directed at state and regional climate
change policies, it is easy to overlook local and municipal activities. This
would be a mistake. Municipalities rival states in the diversity-if not the
scale-of their efforts to address climate change. For example, in the
United States, 196 mayors from over 38 states have united to combat
global climate change, with the objective of meeting the Kyoto Protocol
target for the United States by reducing greenhouse gas emissions in
United States' cities to seven percent below 1990 levels by 2012.132
Individual cities are often surpassing this initiative, with cities such as New
York adopting targets of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in excess of
3
1
2020.1
by
percent
thirty
Many local efforts function on the basis of cooperative, public-private
partnerships.
Local efforts based on cooperation and collaboration
between interested parties offer three main benefits. First, the efforts
facilitate policy-making that is effective in addressing the root causes and
130Engel
11 Engel,
132

& Saleska, supra note 17, at 212.
supra note 52, at 70.
See
U.S.
Mayors

Climate

Protection

Agreement,

http://www.seattle.gov/mayor/climate/default.htm#what (last visited Apr. 15, 2006) (outlining the U.S.
Mayors'
Climate
Protection
Agreement);
Sustain
This!,
http://www.seattle.gov/environment/Documents/newsletter/SustainThis-vl0.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2008) ("As of January 15, 2006, 196 mayors representing more than 40 million people in 38 different
states had joined the coalition.").
133 NYC.gov, plaNYC, http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/html/home/home.shtml (last visited
Mar. 21, 2008).
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specific manifestations of climate change at the local level. Second, local
policies provide paradigms for structuring policies at the state and national
level. Third, local policies promote public awareness and participation
that, in turn, contribute to the grassroots political movement within the
United States whereby environmental policies and, especially, climate
change policies are being driven by political pressure from the bottom-up.
0. State and Local Climate ChangePolicies in Review
The flood of independent and collaborative climate change law and
policy-making activities taking place at the state and local level is
unparalleled in modem environmental history. In the United States, state
and local governments are currently acting in an open legal field. They are
neither bound by international greenhouse gas emission reduction
commitments nor constrained by federal climate change legislation. The
open field creates a situation similar to that in the 1960s when, prior to the
federal government's subsuming of the field, states had primary decisionmaking authority and responsibility for environmental protection. At that
time, by and large, states opted for minimal environmental standards in
favor of promoting economic activity, creating a race to the bottom
scenario.1 34 At present, in many cases, the opposite is true. The faith the
public once vested in the federal government is now vested with state and
local governments as the potential harbingers of change. Sub-federal
governments are responding by taking varied steps-both substantive and
symbolic-to fill the regulatory vacuum.
This is not to suggest that state and local governments have developed
comprehensive, robust regulatory structures for climate change. On the
whole, they have not-with notable exceptions, such as the efforts
underway in California. Sub-federal governments are merely in the
process of laying the foundations for local and regional climate change
strategies. The rate of law and policy evolution at the sub-federal level,
however, greatly outpaces the actions of the federal government. State and
local governments incrementally are building the foundations for long-term
climate change regulatory frameworks.
Regardless of the progress state and local governments achieve or the
pace at which they achieve it, ultimately, it will be impossible for subfederal governments to be the dominant figures in United States' climate
change policy. In the long-term, a comprehensive climate change policy
regime requires initiatives to: regulate greenhouse gas emissions; promote
and mandate changes in energy production and consumption; facilitate
changes in the transport sector; engage all sectors of public and private
134See Engel & Saleska, supra note 17, at 216 n.95 (noting that the federal government increased
environmental protection regulation because the states had failed to adequately address the problem).
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society in efforts to address the multitude of social, political, and economic
challenges posed by climate change. The United States federalist system
of governance coupled with the historic development of federal authority
in environmental law suggests that comprehensive regulatory regimes-for
greenhouse gas emissions, for energy production and consumption, for
transportation, and for coordinated public and private attempts to address
trans-boundary environmental problems-is not only the domain of the
federal government but would, finally, prove impossible in a country as
diverse as the United States without federal coordination.
Further, as a federalist State, only the federal government has the legal
authority to enter international negotiations on behalf of the nation. Given
the global nature of climate change, the influence of the United States
federal government in international negotiations is as important as the
domestic legal and political approach the United States adopts. No level of
coordinated sub-federal activity will be able to change the fact that the
federal government is the final voice of authority in most domestic
regulation and all binding international negotiations. Sub-federal efforts
might, however, influence the attitude the federal government adopts
towards climate change, which in turn, will shape federal choices at the
domestic and international level. This is the most important role subfederal governments play-the role of agenda-setters.
Sub-federal climate change initiatives play a significant role in shaping
the federal climate change agenda; however, they only form part of the
picture. Part V moves beyond state and local government activities to
explore how public and private parties are using litigation, regulation and
international mechanisms to influence the United States' federal climate
change policy. The analysis suggests that, in the majority of cases, parties
are turning to litigation, regulation and international mechanisms to compel
the federal government to take its "rightful"---or at least traditional-place
in environmental policy making.
V. ALTERNATIVE

FORMS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LAW & POLICY-MAKING
IN THE UNITED STATES

In a nation as geographically, politically and socially diverse as the
United States, federal policy is continuously influenced by on-going legal
initiatives nation-wide. These initiatives can take the form of state laws,
local laws, litigation, regulation, and, even, recourse to international law.
In the absence of overarching federal legislation on the question of climate
change, public and private entities are seeking diverse points of access to
federal policy.
A. Climate ChangeLitigation in the United States
In the United States, state and local climate change policies are
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creating momentum for political change. These political efforts, however,
are dispersed and varied, making it difficult to bring about rapid federal
responses. One traditional avenue for directly engaging the United States
federal government in areas of environmental protection where attention
lags is through the judiciary. Judicial actions can be directly addressed or
appealed to the federal courts. Judicial challenges provide a mechanism
agenda that otherwise might
for forcing an issue directly onto the political
5
indefinitely.13
radar
federal
the
off
remain
Increasingly, litigation is seen as an avenue for change in the context
of climate change policy. 136 More than a dozen lawsuits related to global
climate change "currently sit on the dockets of our federal and state
courts.' 3 7 In the sections that follow, this Article reviews several specific
cases-among many-where petitioners are using the judiciary in new and
creative ways to38 require public and private individuals to respond to
climate change.
B. Private Suit Against the Federal Government: Friends of the Earth v.
Watson/Mosbacher
In 2002, two non-profit environmental groups and four cities sued the
United States government in federal court alleging that financial
investments made by federal agencies have harmed the United States by
escalating the intensity of global warming.' 39 In Friends of the Earth v.
Watson, the plaintiffs contend that, over the past ten years, the ExportImport Bank (Ex-Im) and the Oversees Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) have granted over $32 million in financial assistance to oil and
other fossil fuel ventures without first evaluating how the projects will
contribute to global warming or otherwise impact the environment in the
United States as required by the National Environmental Policy Act
131Id. at 219-20 (discussing litigation to compel the federal government to implement mandatory
greenhouse gas regulation).
136 See Michael G. Faure & Andr6 Nolkaemper, InternationalLiability as an Instrument to

Prevent and Compensate for Climate Change, 26A STANFORD ENVTL. L.J. 123 (2007), for a

comprehensive review of the ways that liability or tort-based litigation can be used in the context of
climate change.
137 JUSTIN R. PIDOT, GLOBAL WARMING IN THE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT
at
available
1
(2006),
ISSUES
LEGAL
COMMON
AND
LITIGATION
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current-research/documents/GWL-Report.pdf"
138 See id. at 1-6 (providing an overview of the different ways litigation is being used to address
global climate change and the main challenges to successfully using the judiciary as a way to address
climate change).
131 Organic Consumers Association, Global Warming Lawsuit Against U.S. Agencies Passes
Court Test, http://www.organicconsumers.org/Politics/globalwarm082505.cfin (last visited Apr. 15,
2006) [hereinafter Global Warming Lawsuit Passes Test]; Press Release, Friends of the Earth, In
Landmark Decision Against Bush Administration, Federal Court Recognizes Harm Caused by Global
Warming: Lawsuit by Environmental Groups and Cities Goes Forward (Aug. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.foe.org/new/releases/august/climatelawsuit82405.html [hereinafter Landmark Decision].

HeinOnline -- 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1383 2007-2008

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

(NEPA).

[Vol. 40:1351

140

NEPA requires federal agencies to undertake environmental impact
assessments for any major federal action likely to significantly impact the
environment. 41 The plaintiffs contend that NEPA should apply equally 1to
42
overseas projects that are financed by U.S. government agencies.
Specifically, the petitioners claim that between 1990-2001 Ex-Im and
OPIC loans sponsored projects that produced in excess of 260 million tons
of carbon dioxide emissions annually. 43 These emissions, the petitioners
allege, contribute to global warming and, thus, impair the U.S.
environment. 44 By harming the environment, the plaintiffs contend that
they have been injured.
This lawsuit is the first attempt by public or private plaintiffs to hold
the United States directly accountable for its contribution to global
warming. Not surprisingly, the U.S. government has adamantly opposed
the lawsuit. In fact, in 2005, Peter Watson, President and CEO of OPIC,
and Phillip Merrill, the former Vice Chairman and First Vice President of
Ex-Im, sought a summary judgment, alleging that the case lacked the basis
for a claim.1 4 5 On August 23, 2005, Judge Jeffrey White, for the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, denied
the motion for
14 6
trial.
to
proceed
to
case
the
allowing
judgment,
summary
Judge White's decision makes this the first time that a federal court has
granted legal standing in a case where the alleged injury is based solely on
the impacts of global warming and where the challenge is based on the
U.S. government's failure to assess47the impact of its actions on the global
atmosphere and the U.S. citizenry.
In a judgment filed on March 30, 2007, Judge White held in relevant
part that NEPA applies to major federal projects that contribute to climate
change. 48 In the judgment, Judge White found that OPIC's activities are
generally subject to NEPA, and that:
based on the statements in [OPIC and Ex-Im's] climate
change reports regarding the effects of GHGs on climate
'4oFriends of the Earth Inc. v. Watson, No. C02-4106, 2005 U.S. Dist. WL 2035596, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 23, 2005); Global Warming Lawsuit Passes Test, supranote 139.
141The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332-4335 (2000).
142 Global Warming Lawsuit Passes Test, supra note 139; Landmark Decision,
supra note 139.
143 PIDOT, supranote 137,
at 13.
44id.
145 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support, Friends of
the

Earth, Inc. v. Watson, Civ. No. 02-4106, (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2005).
'46 Global Warming Lawsuit Passes Test, supra note 139; Landmark Decision, supra note 139.
147 Landmark Decision, supra note 139.

'48Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting in Part and Denying in
Part Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, No C02-cv04106, at 19 (N. D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://ww.climatelaw.org/cases/casedocuments/us/NEPA-decision-Mar07.pdf.
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change, it would be difficult for the Court to conclude that
dispute that GHGs do not
Defendants have created a genuine
49
contribute to global warming.
He concluded that the court could not determine whether OPIC and
Ex-Im projects qualify as major federal actions for purposes of NEPA
without a "fact intensive inquiry" and ordered the parties to prepare for a
trial on the merits of the case.15 °
Judge White's decision on the petitions for summary judgment is
noteworthy because of its broad interpretation of standing requirements,
the applicability of NEPA to OPIC and Ex-Im activities, and the relevance
of NEPA in the context of climate change. The decision on the merits of
the case will be even more significant. If the Court upholds the plaintiffs
-claims, the decision will set an important precedent whereby
environmental impact statements prepared pursuant to NEPA will require
federal agencies to evaluate the impacts of climate change on the proposed
project-making climate change a key part of federal decision-making
processes.
C. State Suit Against Private Industry: State of Connecticut et al. v.
American Electric Power Co. et al.
While it is imperative that the federal government plays a leading role
in addressing climate change, it is equally important that private industry
actively participates in these efforts. Private companies are the primary
sources of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. Ensuring their
participation, either through regulatory regimes or financial incentives, is
essential to a comprehensive climate change policy. Currently, however,
there is no federal regulatory system ensuring that private industry
substantially reduces its greenhouse gas emissions. Recognizing the
importance of private sector participation, on July 21, 2004, eight U.S.
states, including California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin, as well as New York City,
representing over seventy-seven million Americans, filed a public nuisance
lawsuit in U.S. federal court against five of the United States largest power
companies, Cinergy Corp., Southern Company, Xcel Enerm, American
Together,
Electric Power (AEP), and the Tennessee Valley Authority.
49
1 1d. at

26, 41 n.19.
1 Id. at 43.
151Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also
Bob Egelko, States to Sue EPA Over Refusal to Restrict Tailpipe Greenhouse Gases: Bush Expressed
Doubts on Link Between Emissions, Global Warming, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 2003, at A5, available at

LEXIS, News Library, SFCHRN File ("California and eight other states plan to argue that [the EPA]
was wrong when it declared ... that is lacks authority to limit emissions of... gases implicated in
global warming."); Press Release, Climate Justice Programme, U.S. dtilities Sued Over Climate
Change (July 21, 2004), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/2004Jul21/
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these companies and the TVA "represent 25% of the total C02 emissions
' 52
from the power sector in the U.S. and 10% of world wide emissions."'
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants' practices constitute a public
nuisance."' The lawsuit is unique, however, in that the plaintiffs are not
seeking any monetary damages. Instead, they are seeking injunctive relief;
CO 2 emissions
they are demanding that the companies be forced to reduce
54
at 174 plants by 3% per year over the next ten years.
The plaintiffs have faced staunch resistance from the defendant
companies, and even from the federal government. On September 15,
2005, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints, holding that the action involved "nonjudiciable political questions"' 155 and because "resolution of the issues
presented here requires identification and balancing of economic,
environmental, foreign policy, and national security interests, 'an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion' is
required"' 5 6 thus demanding a "single-voiced statement of the
Government's views. 157
The District Court decision did not bring this case to an end. On
December 15, 2005, eight U.S. states, the city of New York, and three
NGOs filed briefs in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals appealing the
dismissal. 58 The outcome of this appeal will be a critical indicator of
whether non-governmental organizations and sub-national governments
can use the Federal Court system to hold members of the private sector
accountable for their contributions to global warming and, ultimately,
compel behavioral changes.

Justice Programme welcomed the legal action launched today by eight U.S. States and New York
City.").
152Edna Sussman, Climate Change Litigation: Past,Presentand Future: ABA Renewable Energy
Resources
Committee
Program,
at
7
(June
21,
2006),
available
http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/renewableenergy/teleconarchives/062106/6-21 06_SussmanClimateChange.
153Id.
154id

at

155
Opinion and Order of Judge Loretta A. Preska at 19, Connecticut v. Amer. Electric Power Co.,
Inc, No. 04 Civ. 5669 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/casedocuments/us/nuisance/nuisance-sept05.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2007); see also id.at 12, 14
(discussing what kind of questions are not judiciable and stating that: "At oral argument, counsel for
AEP and Cinergy argued that by 'asking this Court to resolve an environmental policy question with
sweeping implications for the nation's economy, its foreign relations, and even potentially its national
security,' Plaintiffs "have put the cart before the horse").
' Id.at 19 (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)).
157
Id.(citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
158Press Release, Climate Justice Program, U.S. Nuisance Case: States and NGOs Appeal
Dismissal,
(Dec.
15,
2005),
available
at
http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/us/nuisance/2005Dec I 5?searchterm=nuisance+cas.

HeinOnline -- 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1386 2007-2008

20081

CLIMATE CHANGE PRESSURE-COOKER

D. Private Suit to Prevent State-led Climate Change Legislation: Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers (et al.) v. California
In the previous section, this article examined efforts underway in
California to address global climate change. Central among these efforts
was the enactment of California's automobile greenhouse gas emissions
law, which requires automakers to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from
new cars and light trucks. 5 9
On December 7, 2004, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and
the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers filed suit in
Federal Court in Fresno opposing California's automobile emission
regulations. 60 The lawsuit alleges that the regulation is "inconsistent with
federal law, as well as fundamental principles for sound regulation of
motor vehicles. 16'
Nevertheless, California's lawsuit is not the only one of its kind. Just
as other states have followed California's lead in adopting stringent
emissions standards for automobiles, so have automakers and sellers filed
legal challenges seeking to block these states from California-style auto
emissions law and regulations. 162 Given that more than fifteen other states
have adopted legislation similar to California's and that automakers have
filed suit in at least four of these states, the success of the legal challenge to
California's legislation-and EPA's decision on California's petition for a
efforts to
CAA waiver-will have widespread implications for nation-wide
63
curb carbon dioxide emissions from the transport sector.
159Assemb. B. 1493 (Cal. 2002), available at http://www.calcleancars.org/ab1493.pdf; CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2007).
160Press Release, Auto Alliance, Automakers and Dealers Cite Federal Law, Marketplace
07, 2004), available at
Carbon Dioxide Law (Dec.
in Challenging
Principles
http://www.autoalliance.org/archives/000163.html [hereinafter Auto Alliance Press Release]; see also,
Susan Jones, Auto Makers Fight CaliforniaEffort to Regulate Vehicle Emissions, CNSNews.com (Dec.
http://www.cnsnews.comfViewNation.asp?Page=%5CNation%5Carchive
2004),
8,
%5C200412%5CNAT20041208a.html; Union of Concerned Scientists, Automakers v. The People,
availableat http:// www.ucsusa.org/clean vehicles/avp (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
161 Auto Alliance Press Release, supra note 160 (quoting Fred Webber, president & CEO, The
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers).
162Id. (noting that Alluto Alliance "joined a group of automobile dealers in California's Central
Valle to challenge" government regulations).
163 "States that have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, California's strict automobile
emissions standards are: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont and
Washington." Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of California, Governor Schwarzenegger
Issues Statement after U.S. EPA Rejects California's Tailpipe Emissions Waiver Request (Dec. 19,
2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/8353/ [hereinafter Waiver Request Press Release];
see, e.g., Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep et al. v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.
Vt. 2007) (ruling against automakers and for the states of Vermont and New York in automakers'
challenge of tailpipe emissions rules); Lincoln Dodge. Inc. v. Sullivan, Nos. 06-70T, 06-69T, 2007 WL
4577377 (D.R.I. Feb. 13, 2006) (providing automakers complaint against Rhode Island); see also
Felicity Barringer, U.S. Court Backs States' Measures to Cut Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/l 3/us/I 3emissions.html?fta=y.
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Following a failed attempt by California to have the lawsuit dismissed,
this case was ongoing until December 11, 2007, when Federal District
Court Judge Anthony Ishii for the United States District Court for the
64
Eastern District of California issued a ruling on the merits of the case.'
In his ruling, Judge Ishii found in favor of the state of California, finding
that California's greenhouse gas law-AB 1493--does not conflict with
either federal law by setting fuel economy standards or federal foreign
policy 165 so long as California successfully obtains the necessary CAA
waiver of preemption from the EPA. In his decision, Judge Ishii goes on to
advise EPA to grant California's petition for a CAA waiver, stating that,
"[g]iven the level of impairment of human health and welfare that current
climate science indicates may occur if human-generated greenhouse gas
emissions continue unabated, it would
be the very definition of folly if
66
action.'
from
precluded
were
EPA
Judge Ishii's decision mirrors a similar holding in a parallel case in
Vermont, where the court upheld the validity of a series of state regulations
limiting greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles. 67 The Vermont
regulations adopt the standards California promulgated in AB 1493.68
Thus, the validity of Vermont's regulations, like that of AB 1493, hinge on
California obtaining a waiver of pre-emption from the EPA under section
209 of the CAA. Together, the Vermont and California cases signalled a
significant victory for States in their efforts to aggressively address climate
change. These victories, however, were short lived.
Within one week of Judge Ishii's decision on the legitimacy of
California's greenhouse gas tailpipe emissions standards-and after over
two years of subsequent delay-the EPA denied California's request for a
waiver of pre-emption under section 209 of the CAA.169 On December 19,
2007, in a letter to Governor Schwarzenegger, EPA Administrator Stephen
Johnson denied California's request for a waiver, stating that "[i]n light of
the global nature of the problem of climate change, I have found that
California does not have a 'need to meet compelling and extraordinary

"A Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep Inc. v. Goldstone, No. CV F 04-6663, slip op. (E.D. Cal. Dec.
1i, 2007), availableat http://news.findlaw.com/usatoday/docs/environment/cvjpsrclub 121207opn.pdf.
165Id. at 55-56.

'6 Id. at27.
167 Green Mountain Chrysler v. Crombie, No. 2:05-cv-302, slip op. at 240 (D.C. Vt. Sept. 12,
2007).

'6 See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep et al., 508 F. Supp.2d 295 (ruling against
automakers and for the states of Vermont and New York in automakers' challenge to the states'
implementation of tailpipe emissions rules mirroring California's standards); see also Waiver Request
Press Release, supra note 163.
169The initial request for a CAA section 209 waiver was made to the EPA on December 21, 2005.
Waiver Request Press Release, supra note 163.
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conditions.''1 70 In his brief letter, Administrator Johnson cites passage of
the Energy Independence and Security Act as evidence that the Bush
administration is pursuing a national approach to "address[ing] greenhouse
gases and energy security," which he commends as preferable to the
approaches taken by California and a "patchwork of other states."''
Administrator Johnson's letter and the EPA's denial of the waiver
prompted an immediate reaction from state and national politicians. On
December 20th, 2007, Governor Schwarzenegger issued a statement noting
that:
It is disappointing that the federal government is standing in
our way and ignoring the will of tens of millions of people
across the nation. We will continue to fight this battle.
California sued to compel the agency to act on our waiver,
and now we will sue to overturn today's72decision and allow
Californians to protect our environment.
At the federal level, on December 21, 2007, Speaker of the House,
Nancy Pelosi issued a letter to Administrator Johnson in which she states
that she "vigorously disagree[s] with your rationale for that decision" and
"find[s] implausible your inference that the passage this week of the
"Energy Independence and Security Act" eliminated the need for the
waiver requested by California."' 73 Pelosi continues by stating that:
The actions of the EPA in denying the California request
cannot help but raise serious questions about the support of
the Bush Administration for state efforts to safeguard the
environment and the health of their residents. As we
discussed, your decision will be challenged immediately in
the courts
and will be carefully scrutinized by the Congress
74
well.1
as
Pelosi also notes in her letter that Congressman Henry Waxman, the
Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
has called for an inquiry into the Administrator's decision-making process.
In initiating this inquiry, Congressman Waxman requested that the EPA
"provide [the Committee] with all documents relating to the California

'70 Letter from Stephen Johnson, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to the
Honorable Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California (Dec. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf.
171 Id.
172 Waiver Request Press Release supra note 163.
113 Letter from Nancy Pelosi, U.S. Congresswoman, to Stephen Johnson, Administrator, U.S.

Environmental
Protection
Agency
(Dec.
http://www.house.gov/pelosi/press/releases/Dec07/epa.html.

21,

2007),

174Id.
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waiver request.' 17 ' The initiation of this congressional inquiry moved the
EPA's decision directly onto the federal agenda.
Public denouncement was quickly followed by legal action. On
January 2, 2008, Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr. filed, on behalf
of the State of California, a lawsuit against the EPA in the U.S. 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals in San Francisco. The case alleges that the Agency is
"wrongfully and illegally" blocking the state's tailpipe greenhouse gas
emissions standards. 176 In filing the lawsuit, Attorney General Brown
noted:
The denial letter was shocking in its incoherence and
utter failure to provide legal justification for the
administrator's unprecedented action... The EPA has done
nothing at the national level to curb greenhouse gases and
now it has wrongfully and illegally blocked California's
landmark tailpipe emissions standards, despite
the fact that
77
sixteen states have moved to adopt them. 1
California's lawsuit has since been joined by 15 other states and five
environmental groups. 178 In joining the lawsuit, New York Attorney
General Andrew Cuomo added:
The EPA's attempt to stop New York and other states from
taking on global warming pollution from automobiles is
shameful ....
As recognized by the scientific community
and most world leaders, global warming will have
devastating impacts on our environment,
health, and
179
economy if it continues to go unchecked.
The outcome of this litigation and the congressional inquiry initiated by
Congressman Waxman will indefinitely shape the political landscape
shaping climate change law and policy-making specifically, as well as
state-federal environmental relations more generally.

175 Letter

from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman of U.S. House Comm. on Oversight and Gov't

Reform to Stephen L. Johnson, U.S. Envtl Protection Agency (Dec. 20, 2007), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1673.
176 Press Release, State of California, Office of the Attorney General, Brown Sues EPA for
Illegally Blocking California's Plan to Curb Tailpipe Emissions (Jan. 2, 2008), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1514 [hereinafter Brown Sues EPA Press Release]
177Id.

178
Petition
for
Review,
California.
v.
E.P.A.
(2008),
available at
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1514#attachments; Brown Sues EPA Press Release, supra
note 176; Keith B. Richburg, CaliforniaSues EPA Over Emissions Rules: 15 Other States Back Effort
to Win Waiver to Allow the Setting of Tougher Standards, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2008/01/02/AR2008010202833.html.
179

id.

HeinOnline -- 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1390 2007-2008

2008]

CLIMATE CHANGE PRESSURE-COOKER

E. Climate Change Litigation Reaches the Supreme Court: Massachusetts
v. EPA
In one of the most important environmental cases of the 21st Century,
on November 29, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in
the case of Massachusetts v. EPA.180 Massachusetts v. EPA involves a
challenge by twelve states, two cities, and a coalition of fourteen
environmental and public health groups to the EPA's failure to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions under Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act,
based upon EPA's denial of a petition to regulate carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases from new automobiles under Section 202(a)(1) and an
EPA general counsel memorandum claiming that EPA lacks authority to
regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA.' 8'
The case began in 1999, when environmental groups filed a petition
with the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles. The
environmental group cited Section 202 of the Clean Air Act to support
their claim that the EPA had the mandate and responsibility for regulating
greenhouse gases from new vehicles. 82 In September 2003, EPA denied
the petition. The Agency concluded that the CAA act does not authorize
the agency to regulate greenhouse gas 183emissions, and even if it did, the
EPA would not exercise such authority.
Upon EPA's denial of the petition, twelve states, three major cities,
and American Samoa joined the environmental groups to challenge the
EPA decision in the federal courts. Similarly, ten states and multiple trade
associations joined the EPA as interveners in the case.' 84
The case was first heard in the federal courts by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit). On July 15, 2005, in a 2-185 split
vote, the D.C. Circuit dismissed and denied the appellants' petitions.
The decisions by the D.C. Circuit Judges "revealed sharp discrepancies
180Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
'81 See Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922
(EPA Sept. 8, 2003) (denying petition to regulate CO because the EPA lacks authority under the CAA
to regulate it); Memorandum from EPA Gen. Counsel Robert E. Fabricant to Acting EPA Adm'r
Marianne
L.
Horinko
(Aug.
28,
2003),
available
at
http://www.connellfoley.com/hselaw/pdf/Fabricantmemo.pdf (concluding that the CAA does not
authorize the EPA to promulgate regulations to address global climate change).
182Massachusettsv. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1447, 1449.
183Id.at 1450.
s Id. at 1446-47.

l Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53, 58-59, 61-62 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Judges on the
panel issued three separate opinions. In the majority opinion, Judge Randolph dismissed and denied
the appellants' petitions without directly addressing the question of whether the EPA has authority to
regulate greenhouse gases. Joining Judge Randolph in the majority decision, but issuing a separate
opinion, Judge Sentelle held that the petitioners failed to establish standing because they had not
demonstrated a particularized injury. In an extensive dissenting opinion, Judge Tatel held that the
petitioners had established standing, that the EPA had the proper authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions, and denied EPA's argument that it could choose to deny a petition to regulate greenhouse
gases based on public policy considerations. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 45, at 6-8.
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in the reasoning behind each of the judge's respective decisions.' 86 Judge
Randolph cited scientific uncertainty and policy considerations as
justification for the EPA's decision;' 87 Judge Sentelle upheld the EPA's
decision based on his finding that the petitioners lacked standing, 88 while
Judge Tatel dissented on the grounds that the CAA "plainly authorizes" the
EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles. 89 The
inconsistencies in the D.C. Circuit Court decision provided fertile ground
for an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
On March 2, 2006, the petitioners, Massachusetts, et al., filed a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court. 90 The Supreme Court granted the
petition on June 26, 2006 and oral arguments took place on November 29,
2006.19' The key issues in this case revolved around the interpretation of
Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, which requires the administrator of
the EPA to set emission standards for "any air pollutant" from motor
vehicles or motor vehicle engines "which in his judgment cause[s], or
contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare."' 92 The two central questions before the
Supreme Court were: (1) whether the EPA Administrator has authority to
regulate carbon dioxide and other air pollutants associated with climate
change under section 202(a)(1) of CAA; and (2) whether the EPA
Administrator may decline to issue emission standards for motor vehicles
based 93
on policy considerations not enumerated in section 202(a)(1) of
CAA. '

The case is particularly contentious because it involves a potential
conflict over the mandate and authority of the EPA between the
presidential administrations of President Clinton and President Bush.
186Rebecca

Cho & Jennifer Koons, Massachusetts, et al.v. EnvironmentalProtection Agency, et

MEDILL

al.,

NEWS

SERV.

June

26,

2006,

available

at

http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/003742.php.
187

Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 57-58.

"8 Id.at
89

59-61.
' Id.at 67.

190 Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

Massachusetts

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/05-1120.htm

v. EPA (No. 05-1120), available at

[hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

Massachusetts v. EPA]; see also David Doniger, Global Warming on Trial: NRDC and a Coalition of
States Take the Casefor Curbing Global Pollution to the Supreme Court, National Resources Defense
Council (Nov. 29, 2006), available at http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/supremecourt.asp
(providing relevant background information on Massachusettsv. EPA).
191Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Massachusetts v. EPA, supra note 190. During the same term,
the Supreme Court heard a second case, EnvironmentalDefense v. Duke Energy, which also involved a
question under the CAA that has secondary consequences for climate change policy. The Duke Energy

case revolves around EPA's authority to require a permit for modifications to coal-fired power plants
under the CAA Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program. Three Appellate Courts have heard
cases regarding this issue and come to different conclusions, creating a circuit split for the Supreme
Court to address. The case is relevant to the climate change debate because it involves the regulation of
a greenhouse gas, nitrous oxide. PIDOT, supra note 137, at 11.
192 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
113Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 45, at I.
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During President Clinton's administration, "two different EPA general
counsel and EPA Administrator Carol Browner suggested that the agency
had some authority to regulate CO 2 or other GHGs under the CAA even if
the United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol."' 94 In contrast, under
the current presidential administration, in 2003, EPA counsel issued a new
opinion, finding that the EPA lacks the authority to regulate carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases under the CAA. 9 5 The case raises critical
questions of statutory interpretation in an undeniably heated and divided
political context, creating rifts that reach across presidential
administrations, federal, sub-federal, and even public-private relations.
The political rifts are evident from the political debate surrounding the
case, with the Attorney General for Massachusetts bemoaning that "[ilt's
unfortunate that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the other states
that petitioned the United States Supreme Court had to be here today to
force the EPA and the administration to do their jobs"' 96 while opponents
argue that the petitioner's case "aims at nothing less than litigating
America into compliance with a non-ratified treaty and/or a non-enacted
bill. This is judicial activism in overdrive,
' 97 perhaps the most audacious
attempt ever to legislate from the bench."'
The politics and frustration entangled with climate change did not stop
at the door of the Court. The oral arguments before the Supreme Court
revealed considerable tensions among the Justices over both the politics
and the science of climate change. While Justice John Paul Stevens
commented on the fact that the current administration had selectively
edited quotes to bolster its argument that there was not enough evidence on
the causes of global warming-an argument contested by the scientists
upon whose report the EPA relied' 9 -Justice Scalia insisted that the
'94
Bradford C. Mank, Standingand Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL.

L. 8-9 & n.39 (2005) (citing Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Global Warming, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,253,
10,257 n.82, 10,258-59 (2001)) (discussing memorandum and congressional testimony by two Clinton
era EPA general counsels, Jonathan Z. Cannon and his successor Gary S. Guzy, indicating that EPA
has the authority to regulate CO2 under the CAA); see generally Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending
Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 99 (2006)
(contending that the EPA ignored its own mandate when it claimed that the CAA gave it no authority to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions).
195
Mank, supra note 195, at 9 & n.43.
'96Supreme Court Hears EPA Auto Emissions Case (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 29, 2006),
available at LEXIS, News Library, NPR File; see also Cohen, supra note 45 (noting that while some
states are frustrated by what they perceive as a lax federal policy, other states side with the EPA stating
that they do not want the responsibility for enforcing new regulations); Supreme Court to Rule on
Major Global Warming Case: Briefs Filed in Case That Will Decide EPA's Authority to Regulate
31,
2006,
DEFENSE
COUNCIL,
Aug.
Carbon Dioxide,
NATURAL
RESOURCES
http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/fsuit.asp (discussing the cooperation between the states bringing
the suit and various NGOs including the Sierra Club and the NRDC).
197
Mario Lewis, JudicialActivism in Overdrive: Massachusetts et al. v. EPA, RENEW AMERICA,
Sept. 8, 2006, http://www.renewamerica.us/coluns/mlewis/060908.
'9'Eli Kintisch, A Hot Debate on Climate Chante, SCIENCENOW DAILY NEWS, Nov. 29, 2006,
http://sciencenow.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/fuVll2006/l 129/1.
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petitioners needed to show the imminent harm associated with climate
change, demanding "[w]hen is the predicted cataclysm?"' 99 And, in a
moment that reflected the apathy and defiance so characteristic of the
policies of the current U.S. presidential administration, upon being
corrected on a point of science, Justice Scalia replied: "Whatever. I'm not
a scientist. That's why
I don't want to have to deal with global warming,
'2
to tell you the truth. 00
After four months of deliberation, on April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court
issued one of the most important decisions in modem U.S. environmental
law. In a 5-4 split decision, the Supreme Court overturned the DC Circuit
and held that the petitioners had standing to challenge the EPA's denial of
their rulemaking petition,2 °' that the Court has the authority to review
EPA's decision, that the EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse
gases from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), and
that neither policy grounds nor scientific uncertainty provide permissible
considerations for EPA's decision to avoid regulating greenhouse gases
under § 202(a)( 1).2 02 The Court had "little trouble concluding" that the
CAA "authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles, 20 3 and then concluded that EPA's decision not to regulate
greenhouse gases based on scientific or policy grounds2 was
"'arbitrary,
4
capricious,.., or otherwise not in accordance with law.' 0
The Court reversed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
and remanded the case, directing the EPA that in re-evaluating its decision
whether to regulate greenhouse gases under20 the
CAA it "must ground its
5
statute.,
the
in
inaction
or
action
for
reasons
In dissent, Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito argued that the
petitioner's challenges were non-justiciable.2ta
In the first dissent,
authored by Justice Roberts, the four dissenting Justices claimed that the
petitioners lacked standing and declared that the "grievances of the sort at
issue here," i.e., global climate change, should be left to the discretion of
the legislative and executive branches.20 7 In a second dissent, authored by
199Supreme CourtHears EPA Auto Emissions Case, supra note 196.
200id.
201

In holding that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts satisfied constitutional standing

requirements, the Court found that "EPA's steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both 'actual' and 'imminent."' Massachusetts v. EPA,
127 S. Ct. 1438, 1455 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). The
Court also found that "[t]here is, moreover, a 'substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested'
will prompt EPA to take steps to reduce that risk." Id. (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study2Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978)).
02
1d. at 1462-63.
203 Id. at 1459.
204See id. at 1462-63 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2000)).
20
1Id. at 1463.
20
61d. at 1464 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
207

id.

HeinOnline -- 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1394 2007-2008

2008]

CLIMATE CHANGE PRESSURE-COOKER

Justice Scalia and again joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito, the dissenting Justices reaffirmed their opinion that the
Court lacked jurisdiction but proceeded to address the merits of the case.
Here, the Justices upheld the right of the Administrator of the EPA to
withhold a judgment when a petition for rulemaking is filed,20 ' defended
the EPA's reliance on uncertainty as grounds for denying a rulemaking
petition,2 °9 challenged the finding in the Majority Opinion that the CAA
authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gases, 210 and supported EPA's
statutory interpretation of the CAA that excludes greenhouse gases as
agents of air pollution.2 ' Justice Scalia concluded by accusing the Court
of substituting its "own desired outcome for the reasoned judgment" of the
EPA.2 12
The substantive differences and the impassioned tones of the majority
opinion and the two dissenting opinions reflect the political schisms that
characterize current American climate change policy. The dissenting
Justices base their dissents on administrative and procedural grounds.
However, the lines between the Justices in the Majority (supporting an
interpretation of the CAA and the EPA's duties under the CAA that
demands more rigorous attention to global climate change) and the Justices
in the dissent (supporting an interpretation of the CAA and the EPA's
duties under the CAA that precludes judicial involvement in the issue of
global climate change and permits the agency more discretion in choosing
whether to regulate greenhouse gas emissions) reflect the conflicting
political tides that have paralyzed climate change policy-making at the
federal level. While numerous sub-federal entities and increasing numbers
of federal representatives push for aggressive interpretations of existing
environmental laws and implementation of new environmental laws to
address global climate change, equal or greater numbers of public and
private entities use scientific uncertainty and procedural grounds to delay
specific and concrete political responses to climate change.
In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the proponents of change narrowly won their first
major federal victory.
On remand, how EPA responds to the Court's decision will be a
critical indicator of just how committed the Executive Branch is to
delaying concrete regulatory responses to global climate change.
The cases discussed here represent only a handful of the climate
change litigation ongoing in federal and state courts nation-wide. Other
ongoing cases challenge both the jurisdiction of states to regulate
208Id. at 1472-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209 Id. at

1474-75.

210 Id. at 1475-76.
21 Id. at 1476-77.
212 Id. at 1478.
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greenhouse gases213 and the construction of private manufacturing facilities
that would emit greenhouse and ozone depleting substances without
obtaining the requisite CAA permits.2 14
F. RegulatoryActions for Climate Change: The EndangeredSpecies Act
As a complement to the more antagonistic route of litigation, climate
change campaigners also look to existing regulatory procedures as a
mechanism for policy change. The most prevalent example of this is the
2006 petition to list the polar bear as a threatened species under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). On February 17, 2005, the Center for
Biological Diversity (CBD), an NGO dedicated to protecting threatened
and endangered species of flora and fauna and their habitat,2 15 filed a
petition with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service requesting that the Agency
list the polar bear as a threatened species 216 and thus accord it all of the
concomitant protections accorded to threatened species under the ESA.
The basis of the CBD petition rested on the argument that the polar bear
"faces likely global extinction in the wild by the end of this century as a
result of
global warming. The species' sea-ice habitat is literally melting
217
away.

Petitions to list species of flora and fauna as threatened or endangered
under the ESA are common. What sets the Polar Bear petition apart is the
link drawn between the polar bear's continued existence and the threats
posed to the polar bear and its habitat-Arctic sea-ice-by climate change.
The petition emphasizes, "[t]hat global warming as a result of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (primarily carbon dioxide,
methane, and nitrous oxides) is occurring and accelerating is no longer
213E.g.,

Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens Coming Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 957, 959-60 (D. Or. 2006); see
also Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Civil Penalties, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v.
Owens
Coming
Corp.
(D.
Or.
Nov.
24,
2004),
available
at
http://1aw.lclark.edu/org/peac/objects/complaintowens coming.pdf.
213
See
Center
for
Biological
Diversity,
Mission
Statement,
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/about/index.html (last visited March 28, 2008) ("[W]e work to
secure a future for all species.").
216CRS Report for Congress, Polar Bears: Proposed Listing Under the Endangered Species Act
(March 30, 2007), available at http://fas.orglsgp/crs/misc/RL3394 .pdf. The petition was later joined
by two other environmental NGOs: the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Greenpeace
on July 5, 2005. See Letter from Kassie Siegel, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Andrew E. Wetzler,
Natural Res. Def. Council, and John W. Passacantanado, Executive Dir., Greenpeace to Gale Norton,
Secretary of the Interior and Rowan Gould, Regional Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services, (July 5,
2005),
available
at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/mammals/polar-bear/pdfs/
AdditionLetter.pdf (discussing the effort to list the polar bear as a threatened species under the EPA).
Threatened is defined to include "any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000).
214

21 CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR PETITION TO
LIST THE POLAR BEAR (URSUS MARITIMUS) AS A THREATENED SPECIES UNDER THE ENDANGERED

SPECIES ACT ii (2005), available at
polar bear/pdfs/1 5976_7338.pdf.

http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/mammals/
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subject to credible scientific dispute ' 2 18 and that the best-available
scientific evidence establishes "that Arctic sea ice is melting, and that
absent significant reductions in human-generated greenhouse gases, such
continued warming and consequent reduction of sea ice will occur that the
and likely extinction in the wild
polar bear will face severe21endangerment
9
by the end of the century.,
The petition to list the polar bear followed on from a decision by the
IUCN Polar Bear Specialist Group to upgrade the polar bear from a species
of "Least Concern" to "Vulnerable." The decision to upgrade the threat to
polar bears was
based on the likelihood of an overall decline in the size of the
total population of more than 30% within the next 35 to 50
years. The principal cause of this decline is climatic
warming and its consequent negative affects [sic] on the sea
ice habitat of polar bears. In some areas, contaminants may
have an additive negative influence.2
Using the ESA to protect polar bears and, consequently, their habitat
from the forces of global climate change creates new points of pressure and
sources of liability for the federal government. Protecting the polar bear
under the ESA will require the FWS to determine the links between
addressing climate change and protecting the polar bear's habitat, which
ultimately will mean regulating--or at least considering regulatingemissions of greenhouse gases. Further, the ESA requires federal agencies
to carry out programs to conserve threatened species 22 1 and prevents the
broader federal government from taking any actions that would
"jeopardize" listed species.222 In this way, a decision to list the polar bear
as "threatened" under the ESA would create new procedural and
substantive requirements for the federal government.
On May 14, 2008-after considerable delay and legal wrangling-the
21' Id. at iii.
219 id.
220

IUCN, Press Release, PBSG, 14th Meeting of PBSG in Seattle, U.S.A. 2005 (May 4, 2006),

available at http://pbsg.npolar.no/Meetings/PressReleases/14-Seattle.htm.
221 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000) (defining the purposes of the act as: "to provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species, and to take
such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in
subsection (a) of this section"); see also id. § 1531 (c)(1) (providing that "[iut is further declared to be
the policy of Congress that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered
species and threatened species and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this
[Act]").
222Section 7 applies to all federal actions, both activities undertaken directly by federal agencies
and nonfederal actions involving federal authorization or assistance. The relevant federal agent must
demonstrate that the proposed action is "not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification" of such
species' critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
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Secretary of Interior announced his decision to list the Polar Bear as a
threatened species under the ESA.223 In announcing his decision, Secretary
Kempthorne also issued the following statement:
While the legal standards under the ESA compel me to list
the polar bear as threatened, I want to make clear that this
listing will not stop global climate change or prevent any sea
ice from melting. Any real solution requires action by all
major economies for it to be effective. That is why I am
taking administrative and regulatory action to make certain
the ESA isn't abused to make global warming policies.2 24
Secretary Kempthorne's announcement marked the first time the U.S.
federal government has acted to protect any species of flora or fauna under
the ESA where the primary threat is poised by climate change. The
significance of this decision, however, was immediately circumscribed by
Secretary Kempthorne's accompanying comments as well as by the
proposed protection plans, which is riddled with loopholes.225
Very few people believe that the decision to list the polar bear will
create sweeping changes in federal climate change policy. The ESA was
not designed as a tool to circuitously implement comprehensive policy
changes. The authority of the ESA, however, should not be taken lightly.
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, an early case interpreting the
reach of the ESA, Justice Burger signaled that the Supreme Court would
take seriously the substance and intent of the ESA.
In upholding a
decision to ban the completion of a major dam project that threatened the
endangered snail darter, a tiny species of fish, Justice Burger stated:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision
whose terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the
Endangered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively
command all federal agencies "to insure that actions
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize
the continued existence" of an endangered species or "result
in the destruction or modification of habitat
of such species."
227
This languageadmits of no exception.

223U.S.

Dep't of the Interior, Secretary Kempthorne Announces Decision to Protect Polar Bears

under Endangered Species Act, available at http:l/www.doi.gov/issues/polarbears.html (last visited
May 26, 2008).
224ld.
225 See, e.g., The Associated Press, USLim Po/arBer As 77vasedSpecea, CBS NEWS,
May 15,
2008,
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/05/15/ap/tech/main4097985.shtml?source=search_story.
226Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 156, 194 (1978).
227Id. at 173 (emphasis omitted and added) (citation omitted).
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In the years since Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the ESA has
experienced judicial "victories" and "losses" but has maintained its status
as an environmental law with teeth.22 8 In light of the historic judicial
deference accorded to the ESA, a decision to list the polar bear as
threatened offers unknown but potentially significant possibilities for
provoking widespread federal response to climate change.
The current Interior Secretary, Dirk Kempthorne, has tried to distance
the polar bear listing decision from federal efforts to regulate greenhouse
gases, saying that reducing greenhouse gas emissions is "beyond the
scope" of the ESA. 229 The Secretary's comments aside, if the polar bear is
listed-which, based on the Agency's findings thus far, it is likely to bethe federal government will be tasked to both actively protect and to avoid
"jeopardizing" Arctic sea ice from global warming.
G. Regulatory Actionsfor Climate Change: The Clean Water Act
In a similar vein to the petition to list the polar bear as an ESA
threatened species, on February 27, 2007, the Center for Biological
Diversity (CBD) petitioned the State of California to add California's
ocean waters to lists of impaired waters under the federal Clean Water
Act.230 The CBD asked the North Coast Water Quality Control Board to
recommend that "[a]ll ocean waters under Region 1's jurisdiction be
included in the state List of Impaired Waters ... under section 303(d) of
the Clean Water Act as impaired for pH due to absorption of anthropogenic
carbon dioxide pollution., 23' The CBD has also filed similar petitions with
all of the California Regional Water Quality Control Boards that have
jurisdiction over California's ocean waters.23 2
The CBD maintains that California's ocean waters are impaired for pH
due to ocean acidification and that the ocean acidification is a result of
"past, ongoing, and projected absorption of anthropogenic carbon dioxide
pollution. 233
The State of California has not yet responded to the CBD petition. A
228See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2536 (2007)
(finding that Endangered Species Act's "no-jeopardy duty covers only discretionary agency actions and
does not attach to actions ... that an agency is required by statute to undertake"); Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Comtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995) (finding "harm" to endangered
species "naturally encompasses habitat modification that results in actual injury or death to members of
an endangered or threatened species").
229 Climate Change May Put Polar Bear on Threatened List (NPR Radio broadcast Dec. 27,
2006), available at LEXIS, News Library, NPR File.
230 Letter from Miyoko Sakashita, Ocean Program Attorney, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, to
Bruce Gwynne, N. Coast Water Quality Control Bd. (Feb. 27, 2007), available at
http://aphid.opusl .com/campaigns/ocean-acidification/pdfs/acidification-cwa-petition.pdf"
231 Id.
23 2

233

id.

Id.
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decision by the State of California to regulate carbon dioxide emissions
under the CWA would inevitably result in conflict with the federal
government over the scope of the State's ability to interpret existing CWA
provisions to regulate carbon dioxide.
The Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and the FWS
provisional decision to list the polar bear as a threatened species under the
ESA, coupled with the new petition to use the CWA as a source of carbon
dioxide regulation, reflect both the increasing interest in using a broad
array of existing mechanisms to force the federal government to regulate
carbon dioxide and the scope of existing environmental laws to
accommodate federal policies to regulate greenhouse gases and otherwise
mitigate and adapt to global climate change.
H. InternationalMechanismsfor Domestic Climate Change Action: The
Inter-American Commissionfor Human Rights
Measures to influence the course of U.S. climate change policy extend
beyond internal players and institutions. Domestic and foreign citizens
alike look to international institutions, such as the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the World Heritage Convention, as
mechanisms for holding the U.S. government accountable for alleged
international responsibilities and liabilities for climate change.
In the first instance, on December 7, 2005, the Center for International
Environmental Law (CIEL) filed petitions with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) against the United States on
behalf of sixty-three Inuit petitioners, representing both American and
Canadian citizens. 234 The petitions concerned the "impact of global
warming on the Inuit and other vulnerable communities in the Americas
and the implication of these impacts for human rights." 235
The Inuit petitions were based on the United States' alleged
contribution to and its failure to address global warming.236 The petitions
emphasized that the U.S., with only five percent of the world's population,
is responsible for twenty-five percent of the world's emissions, and that the
U.S. government is not only refusing to participate in the international
climate change regime but is "actively impeding the ability of the global
234

Inuit File Petition with Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Claiming Global

Warming Caused by United States Is Destroying Their Culture and Livelihoods, CIEL, Dec. 7, 2005,
http://www.ciel.org/Climate/ICCPetition_7DecO5.html [hereinafter Inuit File Petition].
23 Global Warming and Human Rights Gets Hearing on the World Stage, CIEL,
http://www.ciel.org/Climate/IACHR Inuit_5Mar07.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008) [hereinafter
Global Warming andHuman Rights]; see also Sara C. Aminzadeh, A Moral Imperative: The Human
Rights Implications of Climate Change, 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 231 (2007) (providing a
good overview of the links between global climate change and international human rights).
236See Inuit File Petition, supra note 234 (noting that the petition focuses on the United States

because they are the largest emitter of greenhouse gases).
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community to take collective action. 23 7
The IACHR rejected CIEL's petition on November 16, 2006, without
prejudice.238 Although the petition was dismissed, in February 2007, the
IACHR invited the petitioners to return to the Commission to provide
testimony on the links between climate change and human rights.239 On
March 5, 2007, Sheila Watt-Cloutier, an Inuit petitioner and Former Chair
of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (as well as Nobel Prize nominee),
CIEL Senior Attorney Donald Goldberg, and Earthjustice Managing
Attorney Martin Wagner gave testimony before the Commission.240
Together, the three witnesses used their testimony to create a full picture of
the physical, cultural and legal links between climate change and human
rights in the hopes of creating enforceable links between international
241
human rights law and global climate change.
While the IACHR is one of the first international institutions to
confront the links between climate change and international law, it will not
be the last. The Inuit petitions signal a trend whereby sovereign states and
members of civil society seek redress for the harms posed by climate
change through international mechanisms. This trend is evidenced by
statements made by the government of the island nation of Tuvalu that it
United States and/or
plans to lodge similar complaints against either the
24 2
Australia to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The Inuit petitions to the IACHR and Tuvalu's threat to bring a dispute
before the ICJ have attracted considerable public attention. However, the
Inuit petitions were dismissed and the Tuvalu case has yet to materialize.
237 Yuill Herbert, President Bush, See You in Court: Judging the Cost of Climate Change, THE

DOMINION, Aug.-Sept. 2004, at I1, available at http://www.dominionpaper.ca/pdf/dominionissue21 .pdf.
23 The Inuit Case, CIEL, http://www.ciel.org/Climate/ClimateInuit.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2008); see also Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for
TransnationalRegulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789, 1802 (2005) (providing a discussion
on the substantive problems plaguing climate change litigation).
239Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to Hold March 1 Hearing on Global Warming,
http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/index.php/csw/details/humanCLIMATESCIENCEWATCH.ORG,
rights-commission-hearing/ (Feb. 26,2007).
240Global Warming and Human Rights, supra note 235.
241 See Nobel Prize Nominee Testifies about Global Warming, Mar. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/IACHR WC Mar07.pdf (noting that deteriorating ice conditions
affect the Inuit in many ways and that the traditional Inuit diet is being eroded); Testimony of
Earthjustice Managing Attorney Martin Wagner before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, http://www.ciel.org/Publications/IACHR-WagnerMarO7.pdf (last visited May 23, 2008)
(contesting that, because one State's emission of greenhouse gases causes harm in other States, this
norm helps to assess States' human rights obligations relating to global warming).
242Robin Pomeroy, US Faces Legal Battles as Climate Bogeyman, PLANET ARK, Aug. 30, 2002,
http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfin/newsid/17512/newsDate/30-Aug-2002/story.htm;
Flotsam & Jetsam: Tuvalu and Greenpeace Sue US for Global Warming, THE-EDGE, Sept. 20, 2002,
=
see
I 77&subSitelD-44;
http://www.earthisland.org/project/newsPage2.cfin?newslD-237&pagelD
also Rebecca Elizabeth Jacobs, Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu 's Threat to
Sue the United States in the InternationalCourt of Justice, 14 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y J. 103, 111 (2005)
(noting that it is unlikely that Tuvalu can establish the legal liability of the United States).
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Nevertheless, the IACHR request for testimony from CIEL and from
Sheila Watt-Cloutier and the decision by affected groups to challenge the
United States' climate change strategy in international tribunals suggests
that, both within the United States and extra-jurisdictionally, states,
citizens, and international institutions are increasingly willing and able to
contest the United States' current legal and political stance on climate
change.
I. InternationalMechanisms for Domestic Climate Change Action: The
World Heritage Convention
Another international venue that is confronting the connections
between climate change and international law is the UNESCO Convention
Concerning the Protection of243the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
(World Heritage Convention).
The underlying goal of the World Heritage Convention is to highlight
that certain sites of "cultural or natural heritage are of outstanding interest
and therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind
as a whole.",244 The World Heritage Convention reflects increasing
acceptance of the concept of "cultural internationalism," which "views
cultural property as belonging to the world's peoples
and not limited to the
2 45
citizens of the state where the property is located.5
On February 16, 2006-the first anniversary of the Kyoto Protocol
coming into force-twelve conservation groups from the U.S. and Canada
lodged a petition with the World Heritage Committee to list WatertonGlacier International Peace Park, located across the U.S. and Canadian
borders, on the List of World Heritage Sites in Danger 246 as a consequence
243 As

early as September 21, 2004, the Sydney Centre for International and Global Law at the

Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, released a report finding that the World Heritage Convention
creates legal obligates for state parties to cut greenhouse gas emissions because of their legal duty as
members of the Convention to protect important listed heritage sites from the threats posed to the sites
by climate change. SYDNEY CTR. FOR INT'L & GLOBAL LAW, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
GREAT BARRIER REEF: AUSTRALIA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION 20-

21, para. 47 (2004), http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/scig/SCIGLFinalReport2 109 04.pdf.
244United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Convention Concerning the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, at 1, available at
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf [hereinafter World Heritage Convention].
245 Maria Aurora Fe Candelaria, The Angkor Sites of Cambodia: The Conflicting Valuse of
Sustainable Tourism and State Sovereignty, 31 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 253, 269 (2005); see also
Mehmet Komurcu, Cultural Heritage Endangered by Large Dams and Its Protection under
International Law, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 233, 259-60, 283 (2002) (describing how the World Heritage
Convention adopted an "internationalist concept of cultural property" and defining cultural
internationalism as the belief that "cultural heritage is the property of all humankind").
246 The "in danger" characterization is central to the World Heritage listing process. The
Convention created this category for identifying listed sites where conditions "threaten the very
characteristics for which a property was inscribed on the World Heritage List, and to encourage
corrective action." World Heritage in Danger, http://whc.unesco.org/en/158/ (last visited Mar. 18,
2008). The "List of World Heritage in Danger" is created and maintained by the World Heritage
Committee and includes properties for which conservation will require "major operations" and "for
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of the threats that climate change pose to the natural environment at the
site.247 The petition alleged that "less than one fifth of the park's glaciers
still exist-and those precious few that remain are melting rapidly due to
human-induced climate change. 2 48 Based on the risk posed to the site by
climate change, the petitioners requested that the World Heritage
Committee list the site as in danger and adopt a management plan with a
set of corrective measures that should "focus on reductions in U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions because the glaciers, which are so rapidly
melting, are within the United States' territory, implicating the obligation
of the World Heritage Convention to conserve and protect natural and
cultural heritage within a Party's boundaries., 249 The petition has the twofold goal of protecting the site from further degradation and finding a legal
foothold for forcing the United States to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions.
Four other petitions have been filed by conservation organizations
worldwide to add Mount Everest, the Peruvian Andes, the Great Barrier
Reef and the Belize Barrier Reef to the list of sites in danger due to climate
In 2005, in response to mounting concern, the World Heritage
change.
Committee commissioned an expert report on the effects of climate change
on heritage. 2 1 The report found that the effects of climate change may
jeopardize World Heritage natural and cultural sites 252 and the "fact that
Climate Change poses a threat to the outstanding universal values (OUV)
which assistance has been requested under this Convention." World Heritage Convention, supra note
244, at 6. If a site is inscribed on the World Heritage in Danger List, the World Heritage Committee
must work in conjunction with the State Party where the site is located to create a program for
rehabilitating and monitoring the condition of the site with the end goal of removing the site from the
list of properties in danger. Id. at 7.
247 Groups Petition to List Waterton-GlacierInternational Peace Park "in Danger," CLIMATE
JUSTICE, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.climatelaw.org/media/2006Febl6; Waterton Glacier International
Peace Park, http://whc.unesco.org/pg_friendly_print.cfin?idsite=354&cid=31& (last visited May 23,
2008).
248 Erica Thorson et al., Int'l Envtl. Law Project, PETITION TO THE WORLD HERITAGE COMMITTEE
REQUESTING INCLUSION OF WATERTON-GLACIER INTERNATIONAL PEACE PARK ON THE LIST OF
WORLD HERITAGE IN DANGER AS A RESULT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES
available at http://law.Iclark.edu/org/ielp/objects/Waterton(2006),
vii
ACTIONS
AND

GlacierPetition2.15.06.pdf.
249 Id. at vi-iii.
250 See Advance Notice: World Heritage Group Must Protect Top Sites from Climate Change,
11, 2006, http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/intl/unescoglacier/
JUSTICE, July
2006Jull 1/ (describing the Committee's annual meeting agenda for the July 8 to 16th meeting in
Vilnius Lithuania and linking to the four additional petitions); UNESCO Danger-Listing Petitions
17,
2004,
Nov.
JUSTICE,
CLIMATE
2004),
(17
November
Presented
(noting that three of the
http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/intl/unescoperu/2004Novl7/
petitions handed in to the World Heritage Committee in Paris are from developing nations and will test
the impact of climate change on listing of sites on the in danger list).
CLIMATE

251 MAY CASSAR ET AL., WORLD HERITAGE CTR., PREDICTING AND MANAGING THE EFFECTS OF

CLIMATE CHANGE ON WORLD HERITAGE (2006), available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/climatechange

(follow "Predicting and Managing the Effects of Climate Change on World Heritage" hyperlink).
252 Id. at para. 3.
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of some World Heritage sites" requires the Committee to, among other
things, "design appropriate measures for monitoring the impacts of Climate
Change and adapting to the adverse consequences. 253 After recognizing
that climate change is a threat to heritage, the report analyzes the key
issues for the World Heritage Committee to consider when deciding how
to respond to climate change.2 54
At its annual meeting in July 2006, the World Heritage Committee
took the issue into consideration.2 1 5 After consultation, the Committee
issued a Decision on the question of climate change and heritage.25 6 The
Decision acknowledges the links between climate change and heritage and
the importance of creating an institutional strategy for responding to this
new challenge. 257 The Decision, however, fell short of the expectations of
many people.258 With the Decision, the Committee created an institutional
framework for beginning to respond to the impacts of climate change. It
did not, however, create any mechanisms for addressing the causes of
global climate change. The Committee rejected a call by campaigners to
cut greenhouse gas emissions and took no direct action on the pending
petitions to place properties on the "in danger" list.25 9 In addition, the final
Decision reflected concessions to State Parties, including the United States,
260
to delete references to the Kyoto Protocol and IPCC scientific findings.
253Id. at para. 5.
2
541d. § V.
255United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Heritage Committee,

Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, June 26, 2006,
WHC-06/30.COM/7.1, availableat http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2006/whc06-30com-07. I e.pdf.
216 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Heritage Committee,
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Decisions Adopted
at the 30th Session of the World Heritage Committee, Aug. 23, 2006, WHC-06/30.COM/19, decision
30 COM 7.1, available at http://whc.unesco.orglen/news/277. The Committee also adopted a strategy
on heritage and climate change. WORLD HERITAGE COMM., A STRATEGY TO ASSIST STATES PARTIES
TO

IMPLEMENT

APPROPRIATE

MANAGEMENT

RESPONSES,

available

at

http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/262 (follow "A Strategy to Assist States Parties to Implement
Appropriate Management Responses" hyperlink); see also World HeritageCommittee Adopts Strategy
on
Heritage
and
Climate
Change,
WORLD
HERITAGE,
July
10,
2006,

http://whc.unesco.orglen/news/262 (discussing the adoption of this strategy).

257WORLD HERITAGE COMM., supra note 256; World Heritage Committee Adopts Strategy on
Heritage and Climate Change, WORLD HERITAGE, July 10, 2006, http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/262
258 See Heritage Body
'No' to Carbon Cuts, BBC NEWS, July
10, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/sci/tech/5164476.stm ("The world is entitled to expect better from the

Committee.").
259 id,

260 World Heritage Committee

Fails to

Act,

CLIMATE

JUSTICE,

July

20,

2006,

http://www.climatelaw.org/media/2006Jul20/.
The US delegation to the meeting cautioned the
Committee that efforts on their part to address global climate change would increase the "risk of losing
the unified spirit and camaraderie that has become synonymous with World Heritage." Id. The United
States continued by emphasizing that it is "the position of the USA that inclusion of any World

Heritage Site on the List of World Heritage in Danger, even though not specifically articulated in
Article 11.4 of the Convention, also requires consent of the State concerned," and that "[t]here is no

compelling argument for the Committee to address the issue of global climate change-especially at
the risk of losing the unified spirit and camaraderie that has become synonymous with World
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J. Overview of Sub-Federal Efforts to Influence Climate Change Law &
Policymaking
The changing role of states, regional partnerships, local governments,
and even tools of law-e.g., litigation, regulation, and petitions-in U.S.
climate change law and policy-making could be put down to a "super
grassroots" movement. This would be a mistake. The phenomenon of
widespread efforts to create and influence climate change policy at all
levels of government is not a mere continuation of a legacy of citizen
activism left over from the environmental movement of the 1970s. Nor
can the activities of States in creating independent and regional climate
change laws, policies, and partnerships be categorized as a normal pattern
of policy-making in the process of federalism. While it is true that NGOs
have played a consistent role in initiating grassroots campaigns to
influence environmental policy and States have, on occasion, adopted
environmental standards more stringent than Federal standards, the level,
breadth, and power of sub-federal efforts to create shared climate change
policies in the absence of a strong federal framework represents a new
development and, arguably, a new era in environmental policy-making in
the U.S.
Facing an environmental issue of global and local significance, and
confronting the federal government's failure-arguably, refusal-to
discharge its customary role as the principal architect of environmental
policy, sub-federal entities have stepped in to fill the policy void.26' As
one commentator noted, "there has emerged a fairly stunning proliferation
and diversification of state efforts to create elements of a policy
architecture to reduce greenhouse gases. 262
The question that plagues this movement, however, is whether the
agreements, laws and policies in evidence are merely "symbolic

' 263

or

whether they are substantive enough to bring about real change.
The review of sub-federal climate change initiatives provided in this
paper confirms that many efforts are, in large part, "symbolic." That is, the
programs create ambitious policy goals but often omit specific obligations
or discrete measures for implementation and compliance.26
The
Heritage." Position ofthe United State [sic] ofAmerica on Climate Change with Respect to the World
Heritage

Convention

and

World

Heritage

Sites,

at

!,

5,

available

at

http://elaw.org/assets/word/u.s.climate.US%20position%2Opaper.doc (last visited May 26, 2008).
261 See, e.g., Engel & Saleska, supra note 17, at 216 (noting the recent gap left by the federal
government in its handling of environmental policy).
262Rabe, supra note 18, at 152.
263See Engel & Saleska, supra note 17, at 215 (suggesting that "at least for now" much of the
current environmental legislation is "symbolic" and "more show than substance").
264For example, Engel and Saleska have noted that:
With several important exceptions, few state and local climate initiatives currently
impose mandatory emissions reductions from existing sources. Instead, many
constitute preliminary steps toward eventual regulation, affording state and local
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"symbolic" nature of sub-federal schemes, however, should not be written
off as efforts by local politicians to gain cost-free political good will. The
central issue here is the relationship between symbolic and substantive
policies, and what, if any, value symbolic policies provide.
In environmental law, the line between procedural and substantive
measures is fine, and often difficult to discern. Many laws and policies
that are largely procedural in nature-e.g., environmental impact
assessment measures in NEPA, judicial standing requirements, listing
procedures in the ESA, regulatory notice, and review provisions in the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act-are procedural in nature, but they
create substantive rights in practice. In the context of climate change laws
and policies, the difference between symbolic and substantive policies
perhaps turns on whether the law/policy creates enforceable rights and/or
obligations. The creation of substantive and enforceable rights is critical to
positive action to address climate change. In the context of U.S.
federalism-where states are constrained by federal pre-emptionhowever, even "symbolic" actions can take on substantive meaning.
Efforts by sub-federal governmental entities to create inter-state research,
regulatory, and political links and to adopt statements of intent, executive
orders, resolutions, and formal recommendations on climate change have
both symbolic and substantive impact.
The initiatives offer varied symbolic values. For local citizens, the
initiatives signal concern for citizen welfare, recognition and validation of
the problem, and willingness to begin to act. For the private sector, the
initiatives signal a forthcoming regulatory change that the private sector
can plan for and that will offer regulatory certainty. Critically, for the
federal government, the initiatives carry multiple symbolic values. First,
independently and collectively, climate change initiatives signal to the
federal government that widespread sectors of the populace are taking
climate change seriously, that they are concerned about the social and
economic consequences of climate change, and that they are willing to act
to address the problem. Second, sub-federal initiatives demonstrate that
certain policies are more effective and more socially acceptable, i.e., the
case of states serving as the laboratories for federal policies. 65 Third, the
politicians notoriety on an issue being largely ignored by the federal government
without committing the locality to costly controls on in-state greenhouse gas
sources. While the federal government is clearly not out ahead of the states on the
issue of climate change, nor are the states quite as far out ahead of the federal
government as one might believe as a result of the recent attention garnered by state
and local climate change initiatives.
Engel & Saleska, supra note 17, at 222-23.
265Barry Rabe notes that:
In many respects, this pattern is in keeping with the traditions of American
federalism. Even before the most recent era of state resurgence, states have long
been incubators of policy ideas that ultimately swept across regions and, in some
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proliferation of sub-federal climate change policies signals to the federal
government that, should it choose to adopt climate change laws, a wide
sector of the public is likely to support these laws. Fourth, sub-federal
actions demonstrate that many cities and states are willing to act
unilaterally, if necessary. In this regard, state actions mirror federal actions
in the international context.
The U.S. government has frequently acted unilaterally to achieve
desired ends in international law.
From banning tuna and shrimp
imports, 266 to threatening sanctions against commercial whalers, 267 the U.S.
has gained a reputation as a country that is willing to act independently to
achieve its desired goals---even when that unilateral action threatens
international relations. In this context, unilateral actions are not used with
the thought that the action will create a substantive international policy.
Instead, unilateral actions were used to try to compel a desired act from
specific State(s) and to encourage multilateral dialogue that would lead to
the creation, or enforcement, of a substantive international obligation. In
this regard, U.S. states have learned from their own Nation State that
willingness to act-whether symbolically or substantively--often prompts
legal and political change at a higher level. Of course, in the international
context, the U.S. has the confidence to act unilaterally because of its global
economic and political prowess.
In the domestic context, the states have varying degrees of economic
and political power. California has both aplenty. This is one of the
reasons why California has led domestic efforts to re-shape regional-and,
ultimately, federal--climate change policies. The states have not been so
foolhardy as to adopt laws that directly or intentionally encroach upon
federal authority, but multiple states are demonstrating a willingness to fill
instances, would be embraced in some later form at the federal level. That pattern, of
course, has only intensified in recent decades as state policymaking capacity has
risen steadily alongside an attendant decline at the federal level.
Rabe, supra note 18, at 130 (footnote omitted).
I would agree with Rabe's assessment that current state activity is "in keeping" with the
American federalist tradition, but I would argue that it goes above and beyond previous levels of state
activism, especially in regard to the proliferation of inter-state partnerships and initiatives and the
progressive and, often, aggressive ways that states are individually and cooperatively trying to both fill
the policy void and chip away at federal resistance to force a more comprehensive federal climate
change policy architecture.
266See Keith Bradsher, U.S. Told to Ban Tuna Imports to ProtectDolphins, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1992, at D3, availableat LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (discussing a judge's ruling demanding that
the United States ban tuna imports "to force environmental policy changes"); The Associated Press,
Judge Says Law to Save Turtles Prevents Most Imports of Shrimp, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996 at 9,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (covering a judge's determination that the United States
must ban shrimp imports to help save sea turtles).
267 See High Court to Get a Case on Whaling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1986, at Al, available at
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (announcing the Supreme Court would be hearing the Government's
appeal concerning its attempted fishing sanctions against the Japanese for Japan's continued whaling
activities).
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in the federal policy void.
Further, while it is true that many of the measures adopted byosubfederal governmental entities are largely symbolic, cast against the
backdrop of a federal climate change policy regime that is almost entirely
symbolic in nature, it is worth comparing the content of sub-federal and
federal "symbolism" to highlight the fact that many sub-federal initiatives
are more robust in method and objective.
Symbolism aside, there are "clear exceptions to the 'symbolic'
diagnosis [that] deserve mentioning.,' 268 California, for example, has
adopted concrete, enforceable emission standards for passenger
automobiles-which have subsequently been adopted by other states-and
increasing numbers of states, including Oregon and Massachusetts, are
regulating
carbon dioxide emissions from new and existing power
26 9

plants.

The combination of symbolic and substantive policies employed by
U.S. states and civil society lays the foundations for active inter-state
dialogue and cooperation. It also creates momentum for states to develop
additional and improved climate change policies. U.S. states and civil
society have a long history and demonstrated capacity for policy
innovation. In the context of climate change, the states and civil society
are only beginning to reveal their capacity for innovation, determination,
and courage.
VI. CONCLUSION

The pushes and pulls of climate change politics in the United States are
characteristic of modem environmental law and policy-making. Tensions
between environmental protection and economic development and between
national sovereignty, international law, and the plethora of governmental
and civil society views that define national politics make it nearly
impossible to develop a consensus on environmental protection. There is,
however, increasing domestic and international recognition that positive
action is required to respond to the threats posed by global climate change.
In the United States, the at-times conflicting developments in federal,
state, and local climate change law and policy-making reflect larger trends
in international climate change policy-i.e., with intense dialogue over the
appropriate legal and political responses to climate change taking place at
multiple levels in State and international politics. Thus, the tensions
between state and federal climate change politics in many ways represent a
microcosm of the debate over climate change taking place in many parts of
the world. They also reflect significant changes in U.S. environmental
268Engel

& Saleska, supra note 17, at 220.

26

9Id.at 220-21.
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policy, whereby state and local governments are independently and
collectively taking a greater role in shaping federal environmental policy
and whereby national politics are increasingly subject to the pressures of
international law. The phenomenon of grassroots pressure driving
environmental politics may not be new, but the shape and significance of
the diverse efforts to influence climate change politics in the United States
reflects both the urgency of the issue and the changing nature of
environmental policy-making.
How the federal government responds to domestic and international
pressures will impact not only substantive efforts to respond to the threats
posed by global climate change, but also intra- and inter-State law-making
dynamics. It is unlikely that the federal government will forgo its authority
as the primary environmental law-maker. Federal-and, specifically,
congressional-action is inevitable.
The federal government will
eventually fill the legal void surrounding climate change. Nevertheless,
local, state and regional governments and civil society have left an
indelible print on the climate change agenda and it is unlikely that-in the
short or long term-any of these actors will willingly yield their newfound
legal and political authority in the climate change arena. Climate change is
creating new social, economic, and environmental concerns in the United
States; it is also spawning new legal and political relationships that will not
quickly fade away.
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